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Abstract
This thesis is dedicated to the analysis of non-linear pricing in oligopoly. Non-
linear pricing is a fairly predominant practice in most real markets, mostly
characterized by some amount of competition. The sophistication of pricing
practices has increased in the latest decades due to the technological advances
that have allowed companies to gather more and more data on consumers
preferences.
The first essay of the thesis highlights the main characteristics of oli-
gopolistic non-linear pricing. Non-linear pricing is a special case of price
discrimination. The theory of price discrimination has to be modified in
presence of oligopoly: in particular, a crucial role is played by the competit-
ive externality that implies that product diﬀerentiation is closely related to
the possibility of discriminating. The essay reviews the theory of competitive
non-linear pricing by starting from its foundations, mechanism design under
common agency. The diﬀerent approaches to model non-linear pricing are
then reviewed. In particular, the diﬀerence between price and quantity com-
petition is highlighted. Finally, the close link between non-linear pricing and
the recent developments in the theory of vertical diﬀerentiation is explored.
The second essay shows how the eﬀects of non-linear pricing are determ-
ined by the relationship between the demand and the technological structure
of the market. The chapter focuses on a model in which firms supply a
homogeneous product in two diﬀerent sizes. Information about consumers’
reservation prices is incomplete and the production technology is charac-
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terized by size economies. The model provides insights on the size of the
products that one finds in the market.
Four equilibrium regions are identified depending on the relative intensity of
size economies with respect to consumers’ evaluation of the good. Regions for
which the product is supplied in a single unit or in several diﬀerent sizes or in
only a very large one. Both the private and social desirability of non-linear
pricing varies across diﬀerent equilibrium regions.
The third essay considers the broadband internet market. Non discrim-
inatory issues seem the core of the recent debate on the opportunity or not
of regulating the internet. One of the main questions posed is whether the
telecom companies, owning the networks constituting the internet, should
be allowed to oﬀer quality-contingent contracts to content providers. The
aim of this essay is to analyze the issue through a stylized two-sided market
model of the web that highlights the eﬀects of such a discrimination over
quality, prices and participation to the internet of providers and final users.
An overall welfare comparison is proposed, concluding that the final eﬀects of
regulation crucially depend on both the technology and preferences of agents.
Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis is dedicated to the theory of non-linear pricing in imperfect mar-
ket forms. A common theme characterizing the essays that make up the
thesis are price discrimination and product diﬀerentiation, both standing at
the foundation of the modern theory of non-linear pricing. These topics
also characterize a good part of the recent literature on industrial organiza-
tion, developed since the 60s and 70s on oligopoly and strategic interaction
between firms. In this already classical stream of economics literature, a
primary role is played by the pricing strategies of firms, the heterogeneity of
consumers preferences and the product lines firms decide to propose on the
market.
The thesis focuses on two particular issues in the outlined framework.
First, the theory of non-linear pricing is evaluated. It is well known that a
monopolist, even in presence of imperfect information, has the possibility to
induce consumers to self-select by supplying diﬀerent price-quantity combin-
ations. The mechanism allows the firm to increase its profits, as it extracts
the surplus from consumers more eﬃciently. Non-linear pricing, however, is
a very diﬀused practice also in more competitive market structures. In those
settings the eﬀects of this strategy are far less clear cut. The first essay of this
thesis attempts to review and present consistently some of the most recent
13
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approaches and the the main results in the literature of non-linear pricing.
One of the most striking features of the literature on the topic is the focus
on the features of the consumers’ demand, while the features of production
have often standard properties. The contribution of the second essay is to
take a closer look at the interaction between the demand and supply side
in determining the eﬀects of non-linear pricing both for producers and con-
sumers. The results are particularly interesting as they can be interpreted
in term of the size of the products that firms commercialize: price decisions
and features of both demand and supply determine the feature of the product
lines chosen by firms in equilibrium.
The theory of non-linear pricing has been developed with reference to
situations of both quantity discounts and situations in which diﬀerent price-
quality combinations are available on the market. The qualitative interpret-
ation is dual to the quantitative one and the theoretical principles do not
change substantially. However, there are a number of further possible applic-
ations of the theory when considering quality supply. A reference framework
similar to the one adopted in the second essay is also widely used in the
literature on product diﬀerentiation. This literature mainly deals with issues
like the supply of more or less heterogenous product lines, quality supply
and the incentives to enter the market or even the incentives to bring to the
market a good which is of a lower quality and costs more to be produced
than a high quality one. This thesis explores a diﬀerent application in the
field of regulation. Can the theoretical principles analyzed shed any light on
a policy debate that is involving many important actors both in the United
States and in Europe? Is it possible to model theoretically the most import-
ant characteristics of the broadband internet market? This is actually the
goal of the third essay dedicated to the "network neutrality" debate and that
is trying to shed light on the "pros" and "cons" of regulating the web.
The remaining of this chapter is dedicated to the motivation and a short
description of the structure of the thesis.
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1.1 Motivation
The latest decades witnessed a relentless development of applications of game
theory to many fields in economics; between these the analysis of imper-
fectly competitive market forms is one of the most prominent. Strategic as-
pects have been acknowledged as the distinguishing feature of the interaction
between firms. This very simple observation allowed to rewrite almost com-
pletely or reinterpret most of the existing theories in industrial organization.
The new approach has driven to the formulation of important hypotheses on
firms’ behaviour that can be empirically tested.
Oligopolistic analysis emphasizes the behaviour and the decisions of firms
in more or less direct competition between each other. It is not surprising,
then, that the analysis of price decision of firms is still at the centre of
the attention of the modern theory of industrial organization. It is well
known since Dupuit[22], who first described what is now known as consumers’
"screening", that firms have an incentive to adopt every possible strategy to
exploit their market power to extract as much consumers’ surplus as possible.
It is a familiar, almost daily, experience to most of us to select a product
from a menu of reporting many possible combinations of prices, quantities,
qualities and other optional services: one can think, for example, to the size of
soft drinks or chips when ordering a meal at a fast food; when shopping in the
supermarket one’s cart is just a bundle of goods chosen from an almost infinite
possible combinations of products, each sold in packets of several diﬀerent
sizes, not to mention the several types of discounts to be obtained through
coupons, membership cards or other type of analogous fidelization practices;
when taking the car for a periodic revision one can opt for a minimal testing
obeying the regulations or for a more in-depth full service of the car; when
booking a flight ticket, the price quoted is varying through time and is also
linked to another series of determinants that make almost impossible to make
any credible forecast on which the price will at a distance of just a few days;
when subscribing to cable or pay-tv one is faced with several possible packets
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featuring diﬀerent types of thematic channels. These are only a few examples
from an almost potentially infinite list of real world cases.
The preponderance of those price practices does not seem to be correlated
to business cycles or slowed down by the several crises that hit the economy:
the adoption of discriminatory pricing strategies follows a rapidly increasing
trend that does not seem to find an end in the near future. The dramatic
technological developments of the latest decades deeply changed not only the
way of doing business but society as a whole. These technological advances
have allowed companies to gather and store an unprecedented amount of
data on consumers and their behaviour. The information is highly relevant
and can be used profitably by firms in a number of creative fashions that
allow to extract from consumers the highest possible surplus.
A question arising in the outlined framework regards the eﬀect of compet-
ition and strategic interaction in determining the pricing decisions of firms.
As observed by Stole[75], “Economic reality (. . . ) largely lies somewhere
between the textbook extremes, and most economists agree that price dis-
crimination arises in oligopoly settings". It is not surprising then, as ob-
served by Armstrong that: “much of the recent literature has focused on
price discrimination in competitive settings”. Given the wide range of diﬀer-
ent practices adopted by firms in pricing no unique and clear-cut answer has
emerged. In general and hardly surprising, however, the eﬀect of competi-
tion is to restrict the ability of firms to extract surplus and discriminate, as
rival firms may challenge them to capture the marginal consumers. In pres-
ence of competition, then, firms may face a prisoners’ dilemma situation in
which they would be better oﬀ if they could commit not to use discriminat-
ory practices. Although this is not the only possible strategic situation that
firms may face, the theme is recurrent in the literature and will characterize
also part of this thesis.
The eﬀects of competition are not limited to firms: what is the eﬀect
of sophisticated pricing practices on consumers? The eﬀects of complicated
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pricing strategies and competition on consumers and aggregate social welfare
are far from obvious. The literature has proposed a number of answers. In
a monopolistic market, consumers may enjoy positive eﬀects if firms price in
a more sophisticated way in case these allow to extend the market served;
this is not necessarily true in presence of competition. For the same reason
for which firms may want to commit not to discriminate, it may well happen
that consumers end up with a larger share of the surplus in case competition
drives firms to an equilibrium suboptimal for them.
A further important characteristic of price discrimination in oligopoly
is its close link with product diﬀerentiation. In many cases, although not
always, competition implies that a minimal amount of diﬀerentiation is ne-
cessary to avoid repeated undercutting of prices and the erosion of all profits.
An immediate option when analyzing firms’decisions is to assume prices as
the choice variable of firms. In this case, product diﬀerentiation is strictly
linked to the possibility of discriminating. As underlined by Feuerstein[28]
assertion that "(...) all firms that have some scope to set prices have an
incentive to price discriminate if they act on sub-markets with diﬀerent de-
mand structures". The literature has dealt in a number of ways with product
diﬀerentiation and analyzing its eﬀects: this theme will also characterize this
thesis, as issues related to both horizontal and vertical diﬀerentiation will be
addressed.
Finally, another concern when analyzing pricing practices and in presence
of product diﬀerentiation is the eﬀect of those on other important strategic
choices of firms. As witnessed by McAfee[54], “(. . . ) pricing ought to be
at the core of business strategy (. . . ), pricing strategies are important de-
terminants of the profitability of R&D, service contracts, warranties, market
segmentation, and other strategic choices". Pricing as well as the diﬀerent
type of interaction between firms in the market may actually determine a
wide array of important decisions for a firm. R&D incentives, service con-
tracts and warranties, endogenous market segmentation and the decision of
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firms to merge with competitors are examples. More closely related to the
goals of this thesis the interaction between price decisions, the technological
structure available to firms’ production and the demand are interpreted as
one possible determinants of why diﬀerent products are commercialized in
diﬀerent ways: many are supplied in a single unit, some in packets of several
diﬀerent sizes while some others only in packets of a larger size. Another
application regards the role of pricing decisions and the freedom to price
discriminate in the decision of whether or not (and how) to regulate the in-
ternet broadband sector. In this market, the telecom companies which own
the network are in principle able to discriminate between diﬀerent content
providers according to their demand of bandwidth and the priority needed in
the delivery of their content. This type of price discrimination, not allowed
at the moment in name of the neutrality of the network, would have a clear
impact on both content providers and final users of the internet.
This brief introduction of the main themes faced when studying price
discrimination, non-linear pricing and their applications allowed to highlight
many of the issues that will be analyzed in greater depth in the rest of the
thesis. The next paragraph outlines the structure of the thesis.
1.2 Structure of the Thesis
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 outlines the theoretical frame-
work of analysis of price discrimination in oligopoly and, in particular, re-
views the recent literature on the theme of non-linear pricing. It is high-
lighted, in particular, the diﬀerent approach in case it is assumed that the
choice variable of firms are prices as opposed to quantities or consumers’
types. The relationship between quality and quantity interpretations of non-
linear pricing is then explored.
Chapter 3 analyzes quantity discounts and the size of products. It is
a familiar experience for most people nowadays to buy products on oﬀer
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at a discount when the quantity bought is large. This chapter highlights
one possible interpretation of why some products are sold with a quantity
discount, some others are sold only in large packets while others only in
packets of a single unit and so on. The explanation put forward is based on
two fundamental ingredients: the first is the price regime adopted by firms;
the second is the interaction between the technological structure available to
firms and the features of the demand side.
Chapter 4 is dedicated to a diﬀerent application of the theory of non-linear
pricing to the supply of quality. The problem tackled is the one of "network
neutrality". This is the headline usually adopted to describe the important
debate on the future of broadband internet. Both in Europe and especially
in the United States, many remarkable actors took part in the discussion in
the last few years. Trying to simplify, on one side stands who believes that
internet should be regulated to make sure the neutrality of the network, that
allows everyone to access it and provide content, is preserved; on the other
side, instead, everyone believing that firms owning the networks should be
allowed to charge content providers to supply them with internet highways
able to prioritize the content and deliver it eﬃciently. The chapter proposes a
stylized economic analysis of the issue and the result indicate features which
may be relevant for the decision of whether to regulate or not the internet.
Chapter 5 complete the thesis by providing the concluding remarks and
possible future extensions of the research presented.
20 Introduction
Part II
Non-Linear Pricing in
Oligopoly
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Chapter 2
Competitive Non-Linear
Pricing: An Overview
Non-linear pricing is a specific type of price discrimination taking place when
the information regarding relevant consumers’ features is not complete. The
theory of oligopolistic price discrimination has a number of distinguishing
features with respect to monopolistic price discrimination, as presented by
Varian[78] and Phlips[63]. Two features are particularly relevant: first, there
is a strong link between the ability of firms to price discriminate and the
diﬀerentiation of the products supplied in the market; second, the results
provided by theoretical models in terms of profits of firms, consumers’ surplus
and aggregate social welfare are overall much less clear cut than the case of
monopoly.
As far as product diﬀerentiation is considered, the classical example of
Bertrand competition well illustrates the point. Two firms supplying an
homogeneous product have far less opportunities to induce consumers to
self-select in a way that they can enforce diﬀerent prices. Companies’ market
power, and hence their opportunity to enforce sophisticated price schemes, is
hindered by the competitive pressure exerted by the presence of rival firms.
This simple example is suﬃcient to illustrate the main eﬀect of competition
23
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on the ability of firms to price discriminate.
As competition is taken into account, the theoretical model used to ad-
dress competitive non-linear pricing needs to be modified accordingly. In
particular, firms have to diﬀerentiate along one or more relevant character-
istic in order to dilute the eﬀect of competition. Product diﬀerentiation is
an obvious option to achieve the goal and this is why it plays such a relevant
role when dealing with competitive non-linear pricing.
A further eﬀect of competition is to modify the impact of non-linear
pricing on the share of the market served, profits and consumers’ welfare. A
monopolist is able to use more sophisticated pricing to extract surplus from
consumers, increasing its profits. In presence of competition instead, non-
linear pricing maybe detrimental for firms’ profits as compared to a uniform
price. The strategic situation faced by firms may then have an undesired
outcome: despite non-linear pricing being the privately optimal choice, it
drives to a suboptimal allocation when all firms choose it.
These important issues are illustrated while reviewing the major theoret-
ical approaches to tackle non-linear pricing in oligopoly, with occasional ref-
erence also to other types of price discrimination. In particular, the chapter
is structured as follows. First, the theoretical background of imperfectly com-
petitive non-linear pricing is traced. As the monopolistic theory can be seen
as a particular case of the principal-agent model, the competitive extension
involves considering games of common agency. Second, the main theoretical
approaches to model non-linear pricing in oligopoly are outlined. The fea-
tures and the main results are illustrated for both the case of price schedule
and market share competition. Finally, a parallel between non-linear pricing
and vertical quality competition is drawn. The models adopted to address
product line choice by competing firms are closely related to the models of
non-linear pricing in which firms choose the market share to be served. The
review is completed by exploring how the model can be extended to address
situations in which the market structure features platforms that are interme-
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diaries between two sides of the market.
2.1 The Theoretical Background
From a purely theoretical point of view, non-linear pricing can be seen as
an application of the theory of mechanism design in a context of incomplete
information. The monopolistic non-linear pricing model, as reviewed for
example by Varian[78], can be seen as a principal-agent type of model in
which the principal-monopolist does not have complete information about the
agent-consumers. In more formal terms, both the principal and the agent are
characterized by a Von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility function ui(y, θ) where
θ represents the type of the agent while y = {x, t} is called an allocation and
is composed by a decision x and a transfer t from the principal to the agent,
and i = {A,P} identify the players. The utility of the principal is decreasing
in the amount of the transfer t as opposed to the one of the agent which is
strictly increasing with the transfer. Both functions are twice continuously
diﬀerentiable.
In this game, a mechanism is a contract m defines a message space and a
game form to announce the messages sent by all agents. As information on
agent’s type is incomplete, the allocation can be conditioned only on messages
sent by agents. The timing of the game is the following: first, the principal
designs a mechanism; second, the agent accepts or not the mechanism and
third the game is played according to the designed mechanism otherwise both
players get their reservation utilities.
In such a context a role of primary importance is played by the revelation
principle: this result, first presented by Gibbard[33], states that the principal
can focus on direct mechanisms or, in other words, mechanisms for which
the message space is the type space, all agents accept the mechanism and
truthfully announce their type as the game is played. The revelation principle
allows to restrict the set of implementable allocations: in particular, the
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allocations implementable need to be incentive compatible or, in other words,
the agent should have no incentive to mimic a diﬀerent type. Between the
implementable mechanisms, the principal select the ones which maximize his
expected utility. The problem of the principal can be then summarized as:
maxx(θ),t(θ)EθuP (x(θ), t(θ), θ)
s.t. uA(x(θ), t(θ), θ) ≥ uA(x(θ0), t(θ0), θ) ∀θ, θ0
uA(x(θ), t(θ), θ) ≥ uA ∀θ
Under a number of more restrictive assumptions, the problem can be
simplified so that it is possible to show that an optimal decision exists and
can also be characterized. Between these assumptions1, it is worth recalling
the Spence-Mirlees single-crossing condition on the agent’s utility function,
a monotone hazard rate of the distribution function and, more interestingly
for the goals of this thesis, that the agent’s reservation utility is type inde-
pendent.
This methodology of analysis has been applied to a variety of contexts, in-
cluding auctions, regulatory problems, optimal taxation, public good games
and bargaining. In order to address a number of issues, the theory of mechan-
ism design has evolved in several directions. Multi-dimensional type spaces
have been considered. In that case θ is a vector characterizing preferences of
agents. It turns out that this case is hardly tractable and some specific res-
ults have been obtained by Rochet[65], Rochet- Choné[66], Armstrong[3] and
Armstrong-Rochet[4]. A second direction of research in mechanism design
has considered the possibility that the principal can contract with multiple
agents, as Myerson[57], Demski-Sappington[19] and Ma-Moore-Turnbull[46].
In this context, it assumes relevance the possibility of agents to report about
other agents against the possibility of "cheating" of agents. Further, the case
1A complete treatment of the principal-agent problem and the assumptions needed to
guarantee existence of the optimal contract can be found in Fudenberg-Tirole[29].
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of informed principals, in which principals have a trade-oﬀ between revealing
their private information and the advantage of conditioning the contract pro-
posed to the information itself, has been tackled by Myerson[58] and Maskin-
Tirole ([52]-[53]). Epstein-Peters[27] and Yamashita[81] focus instead on the
case of multiple principals and multiple agents.
As far as non-linear pricing is concerned the case of so called "common
agency" is particularly interesting. Competitive non-linear pricing, in fact,
can be seen as a particular case in the general theory of common agency
games under incomplete information. This type of games were pioneered by
the papers of Martimort[47] and Stole[73]. A distinction can be made between
intrinsic common agency, in which the agent decides whether to contract with
both agents or neither, as compared with the delegated common agency case
in which the agent can contract with only one of the principals. In presence
of multiple principals competing for a single agent, the revelation principle
may not be valid. Calzolari-Pavan[10] identify three fundamental problems
with the revelation principle: first, agents may serve as a coordination device
for the principals and restricting the space of messages may aﬀect the gener-
ality of the outcome; second, equilibria involving randomization over indirect
mechanisms may exist; third, out of equilibrium allocations may be part of
the equilibrium mechanism. The first two problems have to do mainly with
mixed strategy equilibria; as in the thesis only equilibria in pure strategies
are considered, the third problem is more interesting. In a common agency
setting, principals can not contract with agents independently, as they need
to take into account the strategic eﬀect on the other principals. This implies
that the usual characterization of the problem through participation con-
straint and incentive compatibility constraint may not be satisfactory. The
use of the revelation principle in searching for a Nash equilibrium between
principals is harmed by the possibility of existence of out-of-equilibrium al-
locations in the equilibrium menu oﬀered by principals. The point is more
clearly illustrated by the following example proposed by Martimort-Stole[52].
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In order to capture the diﬃculties with the revelation principle it suﬃcient to
focus on a complete information setting. There exist two principals P1 and
P2 and agent A. The strategies available to the principals are Si = {A,B,C}
while the payoﬀs are given by U = {uP1, uP2, uA}. The game is summarized
by the payoﬀ matrix in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1 Payoﬀs for a Simple Common Agency Game.
s2 = A s2 = B s2 = C
s1 = A 1, 1, 1 2, 0, 2 −1, 5, 10
s1 = B 0, 2, 2 1, 1, 1 0, 0, 0
s1 = C 5,−1, 10 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0
A Perfect Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the game is given by the following
menu of contracts: each principal oﬀers the menu s∗i = {B,C} and the agent
chooses B. C is oﬀered by the principal as an oﬀ-equilibrium choice by
principal 1 to discourage principal 2 by oﬀering A. If principal 1 were to oﬀer
onlyB then principal 2 best response would be to oﬀerA. By simply inserting
C in the contract menu, principal 1 discourages principal 2 from oﬀering A
which would leave him with a payoﬀ of −1, as the agent would then choose
C from principal 1. Epstein-Peters[27] suggest that enlarging the message
space to a universal set, comprehending market information, would restore
the revelation principle: this universal set, however, may be of little help in
applications as it may not be easy to characterize. The solution proposed
by the Martimort-Stole[52] and Peters ([60]-[62]) comes from the use of the
generalization of the taxation principle of Guesnerie-Laﬀont[35], called the
delegation principle: instead of focusing on direct mechanisms, it is possible
to focus on a restricted class of indirect mechanisms in which principals design
menus of alternatives while the choice of the option is delegated to the agent.
Given the challenging theoretical issues and the interesting economic ap-
plications, the topic has received a great deal of attention in the last two dec-
ades. The following contributions are worth to be mentioned. Mezzetti[55]
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considers a case of intrinsic common agency in which principals are horizont-
ally diﬀerentiated: in this case, the diﬀerentiation of principals implies that
the agent faces countervailing incentives in reporting his type, limiting the
distortions highlighted by Stole[73] and Martimort[47]. Peters[61] identifies
a set of restrictions on players’ preferences, called the "no-externalities con-
dition" under which there is no loss of generality in restricting the principal’s
strategies to be take-it or leave-it oﬀers. Calzolari-Pavan[11] discuss the case
of sequential contracting in common agency: they conclude that the use of
menus may not be equivalent to the use of general mechanisms. Martimort-
Stole[53] analyze the problem of the multiplicity of equilibria in a delegated
common agency game proposing a refinement of "local truthfulness of equi-
libria". Laussel-Lebreton[45] and Chiesa-Denicolò[15] consider trading under
complete information: the first contribution rationalizes the use of truthful
revelation in presence of ex-ante uncertainty over agent’s characteristic while
the second focuses on a special class of common agency games for which
not always the truthful revelation equilibrium is the Pareto dominant for the
principals.
2.2 Competitive Non-Linear Pricing: Price
Competition
After outlining the theoretical background, the theory of competitive non-
linear pricing can be presented. The two major approaches to modelling
competitive non-linear pricing are reviewed: the first assumes that prices are
the firms’ choice variables while the second focuses on the share of consumers
served or, in other words, quantity supplied. The crucial role of product
diﬀerentiation in allowing oligopolistic firms to choose more sophisticated
pricing strategies is underlined: in particular, it will be shown that product
diﬀerentiation is strictly linked to price discrimination not only when firms
have prices as choice variables but also when the product line is chosen.
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Following Armstrong[2], non-linear pricing as compared to uniform pricing
is a case of firms having more information to price discriminate. The eﬀect
of more information is going to be discussed and the implications in terms
of profits and welfare are presented.
2.2.1 Price Competition
The first approach to model oligopolistic interaction between firms practicing
non-linear pricing is to assume that their choice variables are price schedules.
A first tentative analysis of such a setting have been proposed by Borenstein[9]:
he assumes consumers are heterogeneous both in terms of vertical (vi) and
horizontal preferences (ti) for the qualitatively diﬀerentiated good. Given the
free entry structure of the model, the demand faced by firms can be decom-
posed into two segments: local monopoly and competitive. Firms can price
discriminate by choosing one price for each segment. The model does not
have a closed form solution but the indications of numerical simulations high-
light that if sorting is based on horizontal characteristics, higher discounts
take place when the fraction of competitive demand is relatively large. If
firms are sorting with respect to consumers’ vertical preference parameter,
then the opposite is true. Moreover, price discrimination has a positive eﬀect
on both firms’ entry and total output, independently of the type of sorting.
However, consumers are damaged when discrimination is based on the hori-
zontal parameter.
Analytical results, however, are provided only by Spulber[72] in a mono-
polistic competition framework. He shows that when consumers have an
elastic demand and their tastes are horizontally diﬀerentiated, non-linear
pricing and quantity discounts arise in a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium of the
free-entry game. In particular, given the competitive pressure of the rival,
the discount received by a consumer increases with the distance from firm’s
location. Two further interesting results are: (1) as the fixed entry costs tend
to zero, the equilibrium tends to the perfectly competitive marginal cost pri-
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cing equilibrium; (2) non-linear pricing imply greater variety and total output
supplied in equilibrium.
The paper of Stole[74], however, has set up perhaps the reference frame-
work for non-linear pricing in oligopoly. The main characteristics of the
approach are: first, Stole[74] considers both a duopolistic and a free-entry
monopolistic competition setting; second and more important, he considers
products that are qualitatively diﬀerentiated both horizontally and vertic-
ally2.
Despite the generality of the framework, there are considerable technical
diﬃculties in dealing with multi-dimensional non-linear pricing. The diﬃ-
culties arising are of the same kind of the mechanism design literature under
multi-varied type spaces, as recalled in Section 2.1. Then, although con-
sumers’ tastes are vertically and horizontally heterogeneous, heterogeneity
in only one dimension at a time is considered to be private information of
agents. Stole, then, analyzes the two cases independently: the simplifying
assumption is that firm can perfectly price discriminate with respect to the
other dimension of preference. As discussed above, non-linear pricing un-
der horizontal diﬀerentiation in monopolistic competition was analyzed by
Spulber[72]; however, the case of vertical diﬀerentiation is original.
Assume that firms know and supply the preferred quality to all customers,
discriminating perfectly with respect to a vertical attribute v. Brand prefer-
ence (or location, x) instead is private information. Each firm i = 1, 2 aims
to maximize its profit by choosing a tariﬀ such that customers buy and truth-
fully report their type (location). The problem diﬀers from the monopoly
benchmark because the outside option in the individual rationality constraint
2As underlined by Stole[75], one should be careful in distinguishing between pure ver-
tical product diﬀerentiation, as briefly reviewed in Section 2.3.1, and vertical heterogeneity
in which the preference of a consumer for quality increase with his type, no matter what
firm supplies them.
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is now defined as:
max{0, u−i(q(xˆ), x, v)− p−i(xˆ)}
in which xˆ is the reported location and q is the quality supplied and the index
−i refers to the rival firm. The interpretation of the situation is easy: not
only the consumer have the alternative of not buying, she can also buy from
the rival firm. The individual rationality constraint then is type dependent.
The incentive compatibility constraint, requiring that types reveal truthfully
their location, is not aﬀected by the presence of the outside option.
Having assumed firm 1 is located at the left extreme of a linear horizontal
quality space and firm 2 at the right end, it is possible to solve the firms’
problems. Despite the participation constraint being type dependent, it is
possible to prove that the relevant outside option for firm 1 is increasing in
θ while it is decreasing for firm 2. This implies that an indiﬀerent type θˆ
exists so that the determination of the market share and the decision on the
quality schedule are independent problems. Stole joins the conclusion that
the market is segmented in a local monopoly, where the usual rationality
constraint binds, and a competitive area, where the outside option is repres-
ented by the rival firm oﬀer. Quality distortion is registered and is related
to the distribution function of customers.
The real contribution of Stole[74] is, however, on vertical diﬀerentiation.
In this case, given that all types of consumers are ranked equally by firms,
competition would bring down prices to cost, jeopardizing the possibility of
any type of price discrimination. The assumption of perfect discrimination
(or delivery) in the horizontal space allows to overcome both the problem
of equal rankings and of multiple dimensions of diﬀerentiation at once. In
this context type dependency implies that it is no more as clear-cut which
participation constraint binds. It turns out that not necessarily the firm
chooses a schedule for which the constraint binds for the lowest type: a
further eﬀect of competition is to increase the quality received from the lowest
type.
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Champsaur-Rochet[13] analyze a slightly diﬀerent situation: first firms
commit to a range of qualites/product lines and then compete in prices
choosing the optimal non-linear schedule. The timing of the game is re-
lated to the observation that prices decisions are more easily reversible than
product lines choices. This assumption is another solution to the problem
of the same ranking of types that, as recalled above, does not allow to price
discriminate. In deciding their product lines firms take into account two con-
trasting eﬀects: first, discrimination would require a wider range of qualities
to better meet the tastes of consumers; second, however, the competitive
eﬀect between neighbouring qualities calls for a larger amount of diﬀerenti-
ation. In the quality subgame, firms strategy are restricted to be the intervals
Q1 = [q
−
1 , q
+
1 ] andQ2 = [q
−
2 , q
+
2 ] and the firms serve a continuous of consumers
indexed in their preferences for quality by the
£
θ, θ
¤
. The authors focus on
two polar cases. First, if the qualities are not overlapping, i.e. if q+1 < q
−
2 ,
then the only form of interaction between firms is in the determination of the
indiﬀerent consumer θˆ. From that, the market shares and the extreme of the
quality ranges q+1 and q
−
2 and their prices can be derived and are respectively:
p1(q+1 ) = C(q
+
1 ) + [u1(θˆ, q
−
2 )− u1(θˆ, q+1 )]
F (θˆ)
f(θˆ)
p2(q−2 ) = C(q
−
2 ) + [u2(θˆ, q
−
2 )− u2(θˆ, q+1 )]
1− F (θˆ)
f(θˆ)
The solution implies "bunching" or in other words that a set of consumers
of positive measure demands the extreme qualities and it is compatible with
the case in which one of the two firms monopolize the market. Second, it is
interesting the case in which qualities can overlap, i.e. when q−2 ≤ q+1 . Quite
intuitively, the non-linear price schedule involves marginal cost pricing for all
the range of qualities supplied by both firms. The last result they obtain is
to characterize the more general game in which firms do not have constraints
on the choice of the product line. Under the assumption of linear utility and
quadratic costs, they join the conclusion that firms make positive profits by
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supplying a single quality: in other terms, the diﬀerentiation incentive dom-
inates the segmentation one. The result is robust to less strict specifications,
implying that in equilibrium firms supply disjoint intervals of qualities.
In the last few years several papers adopted the Stole[74] or a strongly
related framework: Valletti[77] considered discrimination over vertical pref-
erences when there are two diﬀerent types of customers, instead of a continu-
ous of them. The model proves to be useful in the analysis of the optimal
location/product design of firms, which is actually non monotonic in the het-
erogeneity parameter. Jensen[40] uses the same model to analyze the optimal
tariﬀ to be implemented, with a special focus on the mobile telecommunica-
tions industry. Jorge-Pires[43] compare non-linear pricing with respect to the
vertical quality dimension both in case the product is delivered to consumers
and when the price is determined at the mill. In the long run, delivered
non-linear pricing are to be preferred for low entry costs or when customers
types are not too similar.
A similar but diﬀerent perspective is taken by Gal-Or[32]: she attempts
to analyze the social welfare impact of non-linear pricing in oligopoly. The
model is then diﬀerent from the one of Stole for the way of modelling product
diﬀerentiation and tastes’ heterogeneity. However, the characterization of the
(type dependent) individual rationality and the incentive compatibility con-
straint is analogous. There are n firms choosing the amount T (q) to charge
for a given quantity q of the brand produced. Each brand y is diﬀerentiated
and customers have n indirect utility functions, so that the favourite one is
defined as:
w(y) = max
q
{φ(q, yi)− Ti(q)} = max
½
0,max
q
©
φ(q, ymax−i )− T−i(q)
ª¾
= u(ymax−i )
where φ(q, yi) is the direct utility derived by consuming variety yi. Firms
know consumers’ preferences only in terms of the n-variate distribution func-
tion F (Y ) where Y is the vector representing all the varieties available. This
representation of consumers preferences is quite general, so compatible with
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diﬀerent types of product diﬀerentiation analyzed before. The price to pay for
generality, however, it is the impossibility of characterizing the equilibrium;
however, as far as the welfare analysis is concerned, the following comparat-
ive statics results can be stated:
1. an increase in the number of firms/brands supplied enhances price com-
petition and then causes a higher number of types of customers being served;
2. an increase in the number of firms/brands supplied lowers marginal prices
for all types, provided that the distribution function is never decreasing in
type.
A diﬀerent modelling approach was introduced by Rochet-Stole[67]. They
consider consumers whose utility for each brand is given by a deterministic
common value plus a random signal, so that each consumer has a multidi-
mensional type given by the vector (θ, ε1, . . . , εn). It turns out that for a
monopolist the newly formulated problem can be solved endogenizing the
stochastic participation constraint and using control theory techniques. The
result is that the distortions are reduced with respect to the case of a mono-
polist facing deterministic participation. The intuition for the result can be
traced to the trade oﬀ between lowering the surplus extracted with increased
expected market participation. The relevance of the model for competitive
non-linear pricing relies on the fact that it encompasses as special cases a class
of models that allow to address multi-dimensional heterogeneity: between
these the model used in Armstrong-Vickers ([5])-([6]), characterized by hori-
zontal diﬀerentiation à la Hotelling. The interest of the model relies on the
fact that it allows to provide a comparison of the eﬀect of competition on
non-linear pricing as compared to linear pricing.
Suppose that firms i = 1, 2 are located at the extremes of an Hotelling
line and consumers have both a preference for the horizontal characteristic
and elastic demand for vertical quality of each of the j = 1...n products
supplied. This is captured by the following utility function:
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V (θ, qi) = u(θ, qi)− tdi(x)− T i
where T i is the amount charged by the firm, t is a measure of "choosiness"
of consumers and di(x) measures the distance of a consumer located at x
from the firm, so that di(x) = x for firm 1 and di(x) = 1 − x for firm 2.
Armstrong-Vickers show that if the market is covered, the two-part tariﬀ:
Ti = t+
nX
j=1
ciqi
is an equilibrium and the aggregate market profits are πNLP = t. Less
straightforward is the case of linear pricing and unfortunately it is not pos-
sible to identify the shape of the equilibrium schedule in that case; the im-
portant result, however, is that it is possible to show that the aggregate
profits decrease in presence of linear pricing, or πLP < πNLP .
This, however, is not the only possibility. Analogously to the analysis
of Stole[74], suppose that perfect discrimination takes place with respect to
the vertical quality characteristic; firms also discriminate on the basis of
location3. A consumer chooses firm 1 as long as:
v(θ, q) + tx− p1 ≥ v(θ, q) + t(1− x)− p2
implying that the symmetric equilibrium price schedules are:
pi =
(
(1− 2x)t if x ≤ 1
2
(2x− 1)t if x > 1
2
Consumers obtain the product from the closest firm, in a socially eﬃcient-
transportation cost minimizing way. On the other hand, if firms are con-
strained to a uniform price, the equilibrium would imply pi = t. The con-
sequence is that equilibrium prices are lower in presence of price discrimin-
ation and so are firms’ profits. The relevance of the analysis proposed is to
3A similar analysis is provided by Thisse-Vives[76] and Armstrong[2].
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show that not always the adoption of ornate pricing practices is beneficial to
firms. As in the latter example, they may face a sort of prisoners’ dilemma
situation: they would be better oﬀ in case commitment to non-discriminate
was possible. However, the higher pricing freedom is privately profitable but
damaging firms collectively: in this case competition has a beneficial eﬀect
for consumers. Corts[16] has given an interpretation of what is determining
whether more price flexibility is advantaging or damaging firms. The key
concept is best response symmetry or asymmetry. Suppose a submarket is
"strong" for a firm if the elasticity of demand is relatively low and it "weak"
if the elasticity is high. Best response symmetry takes place if firms eval-
uate the same sub-markets as being the "strong" one and the "weak" one
respectively; when the ranking is diﬀerent, then best response asymmetry
takes place. The first example provided by Armstrong-Vickers ([5])-([6]) in-
volves best response symmetry, the one of Thisse-Vives[76] best response
asymmetry.
A final word deserves the case in which consumers can buy diﬀerentiated
goods from diﬀerent providers at the same time. In that case, Martimort-
Stole[50] adapt the theory of common agency, surveyed in Section 2.1, to non-
linear pricing. The firms’ problem changes in a similar way as in Stole[74]:
the participation constraints are now type dependent, due to the strategic
eﬀect of the competing firm. The results depend on whether common agency
is intrinsic or delegated. In case consumers can either buy from both buyers
or stay out of the market, the equilibrium outcome involves more distortions
than in the monopoly benchmark. If they can opt to buy the product from
one firm only, then the result depends on whether the goods contracted are
complements or substitutes. Market participation increases when the goods
are substitutes and vice versa if they are complements. Ivaldi-Martimort[39]
go a step further: they consider the case of consumers in common between
firms and characterized by private information in two dimensions (θ1, θ2).
The trick to deal with this complicated case is to adopt a change of variable
38 Competitive Non-Linear Pricing: An Overview
such that consumers’ heterogeneity is captured by a single dimensional sum-
mary statistic. The model is also parametrized in a way that can be fitted
to empirical data from the French energy market.
2.3 Quantity Competition
A second stream of literature considers competition in non-linear pricing
models when firms compete in quantities supplied. The choice variable in
these models is either quantity or the share of consumers served or the
product line: the interpretation may be more convenient in one case rather
than others but the principles and the results are not aﬀected.
The first analysis of Cournot competition and firms are allowed to prac-
tice second degree price discrimination can be traced back to Oren-Smith-
Wilson[59]. Consider n symmetric firms supplying an homogeneous good to a
continuous of consumers’ types θ. Consumers of type θ will buy the quantity
q(θ) if and only if the price-quantity combination is maximizing their con-
sumers surplus (i.e. the incentive compatibility constraint holds) and yields
a non-negative consumer surplus (i.e. the individual rationality constraint
holds). In equilibrium there can be two situations: the optimal policy being
either serving all θs or restricting the market to the first θ1 highest types.
The main diﬀerence with the price competition approach is that the i-th
firm takes into account these constraints to maximize its profits defined on
the residual demand function. In other words, given the (n − 1) rival firms
decisions, i acts as a monopolist on her own share of demand.
In the outlined framework Oren-Smith-Wilson[59] show how the prob-
lem can be expressed in several alternative ways as the choice variable, the
total supply as function of type-disaggregated parameters, is diﬀerently in-
terpreted. Firms can either choose directly the quantity supplied to each
type or select the value of the last consumer’s type served, as it is the case
in Ireland[38].
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The elasticity interpretation of pricing in the original Cournot framework can
be adapted to the case of non-linear pricing case: for each level of quantity
demanded q, in fact, the equilibrium mark-up ratio is equal to the inverse
of the elasticity of demand evaluated at that specific point of the demand
schedule times the number of oligopolistic suppliers:
p(q)− c(q)
p(q)
=
1
nεN(q)
where p(q) is the price schedule while c(q) is the marginal cost of supplying
a given quantity while n is the number of firms and εN(q) is the elasticity
relative to a specific cumulative demand N(p(q), q) up to quantity q.
The model works as well in the quality interpretation and several authors
have used similar approaches to analyze the optimal product line choice by
oligopolistic firms. Next then, this parallel is exploited further, after briefly
outlining the theory of vertical quality diﬀerentiation.
2.3.1 Vertical Quality Diﬀerentiation
Product Diﬀerentiation is a classical topic in economics: a long time passed
since Hotelling[36] and Chamberlin[12] formalized the idea that firms have in-
centives to strategically diﬀerentiate to soften competition and supply products
with heterogeneous characteristics to prevent a perfectly competitive market
outcome. A relevant distinction can be made between horizontal and vertical
diﬀerentiation. Broadly speaking, horizontal product diﬀerentiation can be
defined as when there exist no ranking between the varieties supplied: con-
sumers do not agree in their preferences. A typical example of horizontal
diﬀerentiation is the preference for objects that are identical in all respects
but their colour, as for example t-shirts, pens or cars: diﬀerent individuals
will have a diﬀerent ranking of preference between the diﬀerent colours of the
same object. Vertical diﬀerentiation, instead, applies to situations in which
all consumers rank the qualities supplied in the same way. Ceteris paribus,
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very few people would opt for a Fiat 500 instead of a Ferrari F430. How-
ever, even this example can be tricky, as there might be Fiat 500 fans club
members who would never exchange their car, not even for a way fancier
Ferrari. A further definition might link vertical diﬀerentiation to the cost
of production: according to Shaked-Sutton[70] "pure" vertical diﬀerentiation
takes place when the highest quality is the only demanded even if the goods
are supplied competitively at marginal cost. This definition is not immune
from shortcomings either: it is however suﬃcient for the goals of this thesis.
Consider a qualitatively diﬀerentiated product about which, ceteris paribus,
all consumers have the same ranking in judging the quality of varieties. Qual-
ity preferences are indexed through a parameter θ continuously distributed
over an interval. All consumers prefer an high θ to a lower one. The prefer-
ences for the product of one of the two firms i can then be expressed as:
U(vi, θ) = viθ − pi
Firms face a cost ci = c ∀i to produce one unit of the good. This assumption
can be easily relaxed to take into account that higher quality is more costly to
supply. Assuming further that consumers are heterogeneous enough in their
tastes for quality and that the market is covered, a price equilibrium exists in
which the higher valuation consumers demand the high quality variety of the
good while the lower valuation consumers the low quality variety. Without
loss of generality, if v2 > v1 then firm 2 charges the highest price, supplies
the highest possible quality in the range and gains higher profits. Firm 1 on
the other hand chooses the lowest possible quality and the market outcome
is maximum diﬀerentiation.
This extremely simple framework is characterized by each firm supplying
only one variety of the product. However, it is often observed that firms sup-
ply an entire product line constituted of varieties of several diﬀerent qualities.
A large body of literature, building on the seminal contributions of Mussa-
Rosen[56] and Maskin-Riley[51], has focused on the supply of products of
diﬀerent quality by a monopolist. The problem of quality supply can be seen
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in that case as one of informational diﬀerentiation. The monopolist does
not have information on the valuation of consumers for quality and so tries
to have them self-selected in the contract designed for them. Defining the
situation in these terms, the link with non-linear pricing should be immedi-
ately clear. The product line then must be designed in a way that induces
consumers not to arbitrage between the contract designed for his type and
the other ones. For example, supposing that the product line is constituted
of two qualities v2 > v1, and consumers can have either a high (θ) or a low
valuation (θ) of quality. The high type should demand quality level 2, and
not find convenient to buy quality 1; in other terms:
v2θ − p2 ≥ v1θ − p1
The relation stated is just the incentive compatibility constraint. The firm
will then have to maximize her profits taking into account both the incentive
compatibility constraint and not only that consumers take part in the market.
The usual individual rationality constraint should in fact hold for the low
types: the price-quality combination they demand leaves them with a non-
negative utility; in other terms:
v1θ − p1 ≥ 0
Self-selection requires a strategic manipulation of quality below optimum; us-
ing the words of Mussa-Rosen: «The optimal policy "smokes out" consumer
preferences, separates markets, and assigns diﬀerent customer types to diﬀer-
ent varieties of goods, thereby permitting partial discrimination among con-
sumers of varying intensities of demand». A result which is robust in both
specifications is that the monopolist supplies a low quality that is under the
socially desirable level. An interesting extension is proposed by Champsaur-
Rochet[13]. Although the case they address is not compatible with pure
vertical diﬀerentiation, they address the interesting case in which the outside
option of the consumers is of a higher quality. Suppose there is a continu-
ous of types of consumers distributed between
£
θ, θ
¤
and the monopolist can
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supply intervals of quality. The participation constraints is aﬀected by the
presence of a high quality outside option v; for the generic type θ this be-
comes:
v(θ)θ − p(θ) ≥ vθ − pv
The implication is that in equilibrium the firm’s quality range is now distorted
towards the higher range of qualities. Clearly, the examples quoted involve
non-linear pricing, so the further developments in oligopoly will be discussed
in what follows.
Both Gal-Or[31] and De Fraja[17] develop models in which both price
and quality are endogenously determined. Gal-Or[31] considers the following
model: a continuous of consumers is indexed by θ representing preferences
for quality. Firms decide their supply which is linked to the product line
selected q(v(θ)). The solution for a symmetric equilibrium allows to identify
two types of consumers, receiving the following utilities:
u(θ) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
U(0, θ)− U(0, θˆ) if θˆ ≤ θ < θ∗
θZ
θ∗
Uθ(v(t), t)dt+ U(0, θ
∗)− U(0, θˆ) if θ∗ ≤ θ < θ
the first being consumers "bunched" to receive the lowest quality level nor-
malized to zero while the second group demands the higher levels of quality.
If the distribution of consumers is uniform, the existence of a unique Nash
equilibrium is guaranteed. The main result is that further entry encourages
firms to lower the quality supplied. In other words:
dθˆ
dn ≤ 0
dθ∗
dn > 0
while dv(θ)dn for θ > θ
∗, which is the increased competition does not have an
eﬀect on the supply of higher qualities. The ability to segment the market
declines with increased competition: similarly to what found by Champsaur-
Rochet[13], firms need to increase the width of the product line. However, in
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this context this is achieved by increasing the share of "bunched" consumers
served with the lowest quality. The eﬀect is to decrease the average quality.
De Fraja[17] remarks that the previous case does not involve "pure" ver-
tical diﬀerentiation as defined by Shaked-Sutton[70]. Instead, it is assumed
that every firm can supply a finite number of specifications i = 1..n whose
cost is linear in the quantity demanded; not necessarily, however, the cost of
a higher quality has to be superior. Having defined gi(θ) the poorest con-
sumer who demands quality i, it is possible to show that the price schedule
is non-decreasing in quality:
pi(θ)− pi−1(θ) =
vi − vi−1
vivi−1
i+1X
j=1
vj−1 [gj(θ)− gj−1(θ)]
As opposed to Gal-Or[31], first it is proven that the only possible equi-
librium has to be symmetric; second, the equilibrium involves "pure" diﬀer-
entiation and non-linear price schedules; third and more importantly, firms
may leave gaps in their product lines even in case the marginal cost is an
increasing function of quality. The latter result is to be ascribed to the re-
lationship between preferences and technology. In particular, this happens
if the quality not supplied would not be the consumers’ favourite, even in
case all the superior ones were not supplied. In other words, "pure" vertical
diﬀerentiation has to take place for all varieties in order to find a complete
product line in equilibrium.
The latest and more general approach to vertical diﬀerentiation is intro-
duced by Johnson-Myatt, in a series of closely related papers ([41]-[42]) based
on the so called ‘upgrades approach’. This new technique allows to deal both
with asymmetric multi-product Cournot duopoly[41] and with symmetric
Cournot n-firms competition[42]. As the framework is quite similar to De
Fraja[17], non-linear pricing arise in equilibrium. The new approach allows
to reformulate the problem: an ‘upgrade’ is defined as the supply to the mass
of customers who demands a certain quality or more. In other words, the
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i-th upgrade is defined as:
Zir = zir + Zi+1r
which is the demand for the i-th quality plus the demand for all varieties
of superior quality supplied by the firm r. Despite the fact that there is
not an intuitive explanation for the concept of ‘upgrade’ as used by the
authors, reasoning in this dimension allows one to highlight many features of
multi-product quality Cournot competition. In particular, in the symmetric
case the Oren-Smith-Wilson[59] interpretation of non-linear pricing can be
re-expressed in terms of upgrades for the case of finite product quality supply:
Pi(Zi)− Ci
Pi(Zi)
=
ξi(Zi)
n
where ξi(Zi) is the reciprocal of the price elasticity for the upgrade i. The
usual intuitive properties of Cournot equilibria apply to upgrades also in
the asymmetric cases: the increase of the cost of upgrade i supplied by
firm r, for example, results in a lower supply of the upgrade, in a general
reduction of the output in the industry and of the profits of firm r. As
every upgrade is independent of each other, reasoning in terms of upgrades
allows to find existence and uniqueness results and interesting comparative
statics properties by simply applying the usual Cournot logic to every single
upgrade.
Returns to quality are defined by the authors as the ratio between the
cost, for a given firm, of producing a certain upgrade, and the price of that
upgrade: in other words, firms enjoy positive returns when CiQi is strictly
decreasing. A further feature of interest of the Johnson-Myatt approach is
that it traces back the product line choices of firms to returns to quality and
price sensitivity. In a symmetric equilibrium in which the marginal cost of
each upgrade is positive, the lowest quality one is supplied if either there
are negative returns in supply or there is a decreasing price sensitivity. The
close relationship between technological and demand parameters is rather
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uncommon in the literature but it will play a crucial role in this thesis. In
terms of equilibrium quality line, Johnson-Myatt[41] find that De Fraja[17]
results hold as a particular case of their model: however, the symmetric
outcome with holes is not the only possibility and asymmetric equilibrium
configurations arise as a response to entry and increased competition in the
market.
2.3.2 Vertical Diﬀerentiation in Two-Sided Markets
The theory of vertical diﬀerentiation and product line choice can be extended
to analyze market structures in which platforms are intermediaries between
two diﬀerent sides of the economy. Competitive models of markets with
intermediaries and network externalities usually assume that platforms are
horizontally diﬀerentiated, as in Armstrong[1] and Rochet-Tirole[68]. This
convenient simplifying assumption may not be suitable when considering
markets characterized by vertical quality diﬀerentiation. Hermalin-Katz[44]
extend the two-sided market model to analyze product line restrictions im-
posed on platforms supplying diﬀerent qualities. Although their analysis is
mainly performed in a monopolistic market, their results are robust to an
extension considering an oligopolistic market structure. Suppose the plat-
form faces demand for quality q from a group of heterogeneous agents on
side 1 indexed by the parameter θ. The link between the two sides of the
platform is given by agents in group 1 serving the other group of agents on
side 2 whose utility depends on the quality received and quantity consumed
u( xθq(θ)); their total utility is quasi-linear can be then written as:
U =
Z
Θ
Z x(θ)
0
u(
z
θq(θ)
)f(θ)dzdθ + y
where q(θ) is the quality, x(θ) is the quantity demanded and y is a numeraire.
However, it should be noticed that consumers of group 2 are homogeneous in
their evaluation of the benefit of participating in the market. The game has
46 Competitive Non-Linear Pricing: An Overview
three stages. In the first, the platform sets its price p(q) to the group 1 of
agents and an access fee h to the second group. In the second stage, group
1 selects the quality desired q(θ) and the unit price t to charge to group 2.
Finally group 2 selects whether to connect to the platform and the levels of
quality and consumption desired. The technical assumptions needed in order
to solve the model are not very diﬀerent from the one used in the standard
principal-agent model and they rely on the revelation principle presented in
Section 2.1. The authors focus then on three relevant situations: first, a social
welfare maximizing benchmark; second, the unrestricted monopoly solution
and, third, a situation in which some restriction is imposed on the range of
qualities the platform can supply to group 1. The extension of the model to
the case of duopoly relies on horizontal diﬀerentiation à la Hotelling: given
th assumption on vertical diﬀerentiation, the model can be solved and the
properties are similar to the monopoly benchmark. In particular, the results
obtained extend to a two sided market a few well known facts: first, agents
in group 1 that would buy low quality under unrestricted monopoly are now
excluded from the market, the medium levels of quality supplied maybe too
high as compared with the first best while the top quality maybe too low.
Further, overall welfare is likely to be harmed by product line restriction.
Chapter 3
Size (of the product) matters...
3.1 Introduction
Walking through the shelves of local shops and supermarkets everyone no-
tices that not all products are commercialized the same way: some of them
are sold in a single size, some in diﬀerent sizes, some others in packets of
several units. Products sold in diﬀerent sizes or packets are also often sold
at a discount linked to quantity. The aim of this chapter is to propose one
interpretation of why diﬀerent products are commercialized diﬀerently. The
answer provided relies on the pricing policy of firms and on the interaction
between the demand and the supply side of the economy.
The following examples can clarify the phenomenon this chapter wants
to address. The following figure is taken from a website comparing the price
of goods in the four main british supermarket chains. It is clear from Figure
3.1 that all firms supply Cola in bottles of diﬀerent sizes (1.25 L and 2 L
bottles) and packed diﬀerently (a single 2 L bottle as opposed to a pack
of 4). Moreover, as illustrated by Table 3.1 quantity discounts linked to the
overall amount of Cola bought. The proportion of the discount varies slightly
across diﬀerent supermarkets but all chains propose it.The approach adopted
in the chapter is not limited to case of products supplied in diﬀerent sizes
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Figure 3.1: Products and packets of diﬀerent sizes: an example. Source:
Tesco.com.
but can also fit the situation of quality supply. This is the case illustrated by
Figure 3.2. Broadband internet connection is supplied by several providers
in many western economies. Each provider oﬀers users a menu of diﬀerent
contracts; for each contract the monthly charge is linked to the quality of
the connection and other ancillary services. As in the example, it is very
common that the monthly charge is proportionally increasing less than the
quality of the contract.
Table 3.1 Products and Packets of Diﬀerent Sizes: Unit Prices
Price/Ltr Tesco Sainsbury’s Morrisons ASDA
CC 1.25Ltr 1.000 1.000 N/F 1.000
CC 2 Ltr 0.745 0.745 0.745 0.745
CC 4 x 2Ltr 0.588 0.619 0.619 0.615
The examples highlight the main features of the approach adopted in
this chapter. The analysis will focus on an oligopolistic model in which
n firms compete by supplying an homogeneous product. The comparison
between non-linear pricing and linear pricing strategies will allow to join
conclusions on the size of the product that can be found on the market1. In
1Although the quality interpretation fits rather well the model described in this chapter,
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Figure 3.2: Packets of diﬀerent quality: an example. Source: Orange.co.uk.
particular, the results suggest that there is an important relationship between
the pricing strategy adopted by firms and the technological structure of the
market. Under non-linear pricing, in fact, firms may find optimal to supply
the packets in two diﬀerent sizes or, in case cost savings related to supplying a
larger product size are relevant enough, they may opt to supply the product
only in a large size. If the strategy involves linear pricing, instead, firms
may either supply the product in packets of a single unit or packets of two
units or, if production costs are large enough, they may focus on bringing
the product to the market only in the single unit size. The equilibria found,
then, suggest that the size of products found on the market are related to the
pricing strategy of firms and to the parameters of the demand and supply
side. These results maybe relevant for policy purposes in cases where the
regulator cares about the size of the products supplied by firms; for example,
public health concerns arose recently due to the tendency of selling food and
drinks in supermarkets in always larger and larger sizes.
the analysis will stress the quantity interpretation. The next chapter, however, extends
the model to focus on its implications in terms of the quality supplied.
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The results of the chapter are not limited to the positive indication on
which type of product is supplied. The analysis is completed by the compar-
ison between the equilibria registered under the two pricing regimes (non-
linear pricing vs. linear pricing). The results obtained are not trivial and
can be linked to the literature on the topic. The extensive literature on non-
linear pricing has focused on the screening role of the practice. A monopolist
uses his market power and the possibility to oﬀer more sophisticated pricing
schemes to screen the tastes of consumers and, by doing that, to increase
profits. It is no surprise, then, that most authors focused on the role of de-
mand side, assuming away complications linked to diﬀerent possible techno-
logical structures. The same observation applies to the more recent advances
on non-linear pricing, considering oligopolistic market settings. The mono-
polistic results maybe confirmed or controverted when interaction between
firms is taken into account. The result is related to the symmetry or asym-
metry of best response schedule faced by firms: if the firms face best response
asymmetry then competition might not aﬀect the profitability of price dis-
crimination; on the other hand in case of best response symmetry, non-linear
pricing leads to lower profits as compared to linear pricing2. However, even
in a competitive context, the relationship between the demand and the sup-
ply side in determining the shape of the pricing schedules is not a central
concern. Remarkable exceptions are given by De Meza[18] and Ireland[38].
De Meza[18] shows that in duopoly economies of scale are not the only way
to justify non-linear pricing: in a model where firms first choose on pricing
and then they decide on output, consumers maybe favored by non-linear pri-
cing as compared to linear. Ireland[38], on the other hand, takes another
stand. In a competitive model of non-linear pricing he shows that scale or
size economies are necessary to justify non-linear pricing on welfare grounds.
The profit increase guaranteed to firms is more than oﬀset by the losses
2On best response symmetry/asymmetry, see Corts[16], Feuerstein[28], Stole[75] and
Armstrong[2].
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made by consumers. The robustness of the results of Ireland[38], however, is
questioned by Cheung-Wang[14]: they show that allowing for more general
distribution functions, the results might be controverted. Moreover, linear
pricing are not necessarily benefiting consumers because they might lead to
a restriction of the packets supplied. Our approach is closely linked to Ire-
land and Cheung-Wang, making the results directly comparable. The main
caveat is that focusing on the packets size and the technology to produce
them leads to a wealth of situation, including ones in which consumers are
benefiting and firms are losing under non-linear pricing.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 presents the model
adopted for the analysis. Section 3.3 solves the model in the two polar cases
of non-linear and linear pricing. Section 3.4 enquires on the properties of the
equilibria devised while Section 3.5 provides conclusive remarks.
3.2 The Model
The framework considered is based on Ireland[38] and it is adapted to take
into account technological issues on the supply side. Consider n symmetric
firms producing an homogeneous good that can be sold in packets of diﬀerent
size: for simplicity and without loss of generality, it is assumed that only
one-unit packets and two-unit packets are supplied. Defining q the size and
pq the price of a packet of size q then prices are linear if p2 = 2p1; otherwise
prices are non-linear. Assuming perfect rationality of consumers, under the
assumptions adopted the two-unit packets are demanded if and only if p2 ≤
2p1. No arbitrage is possible.The supply side is characterized by a production
technology which allows cost savings related to the size of products. An
intuitive way of justifying the assumption relates to the packaging and selling
costs to bring the product to the market. Suppose that the total cost is a
function of three inputs:
TC = wl + rk + Pq
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in which l represents labor and w is its given price, k is capital whose price
is r and the size-dependent cost of packaging devices is denoted by Pq. It is
clear that the packaging cost component depends on size q and it is assumed
that Pq/q is weakly decreasing in q, i.e. P1 ≥ P2/2. This implies that
the marginal and average costs of production are constant with respect to
demanded quantity, but they decline with size q. The previous discussion
allows us to state Assumption 13:
Assumption 1 The production of each firm takes place according to the
following cost function:
C(q, x1, x2, Qq) =
(
cD1(x1, x2, Q1) if q = 1
2θcD2(x1, x2, Q2) if q = 2
in which θ ∈ [1/2, 1].
The parameter θ has an intuitive interpretation: it can be thought as a
measure of the savings in packaging costs related to size, i.e.:
θ =
P2/2
P1
Two limiting cases are encompassed in this description: if P2 is exactly the
double of P1 the model is the same one as in Ireland while if the cost P is
fixed and does not depend on the size of the packet, i.e. when P1 = P2, the
value of θ is equal to 1/2.
The demand side is constituted by a continuum of consumers character-
ized by a type parameter x that expresses their willingness to pay for one unit
of the good. Consumers are distributed according to a distribution function
f(x) that is assumed to be continuous, twice diﬀerentiable and with domain
3In the light of the previous discussion, it is worth to underline further the diﬀerence
between size and scale economies. The present chapter focuses on the former and not on
the latter.
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x ∈ [0, 1]. Each consumer can demand either nothing or the one-unit packet
or the two-unit packet. According to the following utility function:
U(q, x) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if q = 0
x−E(q) if q = 1
bx− E(q) if q = 2
in which x ∈ [0, 1], q = 0, 1, 2 are the units of product bought, E(q) is
the expenditure necessary to buy the desired packet, the marginal utility of
consumption is non-increasing. This is captured by the parameter b, about
which the following holds:
Assumption 2 The marginal decrease of utility in consuming a second unit
of the good is the same across all consumers so that the willingness to pay
for the second unit in the package is (b− 1)x, b ∈ [1, 2].
All consumers aim to maximize their utility, i.e. choose q such that:
max{0, x− p1, bx− p2}
The demand faced by each firm is derived by identifying the marginal con-
sumers, given a set of prices (p1, p2). Agents of type x1 are indiﬀerent between
buying nothing or one unit if:
x1 − p1 = 0⇔ x1 = p1
Customers of type x2 are indiﬀerent between one unit or two units if:
(b− 1)x2 = p2 − p1
from which:
x2 =
p2 − p1
b− 1
To summarize consumer’s choices, then:
q =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if 0 < x < x1
1 if x1 < x < x2
2 if x2 < x < 1
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from which the total demand is computed as follows:
Dq(x1, x2, Qq) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if 0 < x < x1
F (x2)− F (x1)−Q1 if x1 < x < x2
1− F (x2)−Q2 if x2 < x < 1
3.3 Product Evaluation, Cost Savings and the
Size of a Good
Firms’ problem can now be stated under both price regimes: non-linear and
linear pricing. The main result of the chapter on the size of products brought
to the market is then stated.
3.3.1 Non-Linear Pricing
The problem of firm i can be stated as follows:
max
p1,p2
πi =
2X
j=1
[pjDqj(x1, x2, Qq)− C(q, x1, x2, Qq)]
s.t. p1 = x1
p2 = (b− 1)x2 − p1
Given the symmetry of firms, the first order conditions for a maximum
can be written as:
∂πi
∂x1
=
1− F (x1)
n
− f(x1)(x1 − c) = 0 (3.1)
∂πi
∂x2
= (b− 1)1− F (x2)
n
− f(x2)[(b− 1)x2 − (2θ − 1)c] = 0 (3.2)
This two equations define implicitly and independently x∗1 and x
∗
2, i.e. the
firms’ optimal choices when price discrimination is allowed.
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The first order conditions can be interpreted in terms of a well known
trade-oﬀ: the left part represents the additional profits on infra-marginal
consumers while the right part represents the losses due to serving a marginal
consumer with a higher reservation value. As opposed to standard models,
in this case such a trade-oﬀ holds for all the size of packets that firms bring
to the market.
3.3.2 Linear Pricing
Suppose that, for some reasons, firms can not price discriminate and
The problem of firm i can be stated as follows:
max
p1,p2
πi =
2X
j=1
[pjDqj(x1, x2, Qq)− C(q, x1, x2, Qq)]
s.t. p1 = x1
p2 = (b− 1)x2 − p1
p2 = 2p1
Given the symmetry of firms, maximizing with respect to x2 yields the
following first order condition:
−(b− 1)f [(b− 1)x2][(b− 1)x2 − c]− f(x2)[(b− 1)x2 − (2θ − 1)c] +
+(b− 1)2− F (x2)− F [(b− 1)x2]
n
= 0 (3.3)
Firms face the inframarginal gains-marginal loss trade-oﬀ but are further
constrained by the linearity of their price schedule. The implication is that
they have one less degree of freedom which is reflected in the first order
condition. The latter along with the condition x1 = (b−1)x2 are denoted by
x01 and x
0
2 and represent the firms’ optimal choices under linear pricing.
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Finally, two aspects should be underlined. First, the two problems just
presented are clearly related. Firms’ choices under linear pricing can be seen
as a special case of their choice under non-linear pricing once taken into
account the further constraint. This is reflected in the following relationship
between the first order conditions. Express (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3) as functions
of x as follows:
FOCNLP1(x) = 0
FOCNLP2(x) = 0
FOCLP (x) = 0
The first order conditions, then, are linked by the following relation:
(b− 1)FOCNLP1[(b− 1)x] + FOCNLP2(x) = FOCLP (x) (3.4)
Second, suﬃcient conditions for a maximum should be checked under both
price regimes. This often overlooked aspect is important in the light of
Cheung-Wang[14]: the authors show how a deeper analysis of distribution
functions that satisfy second order conditions allows to obtain more general
results on non-linear pricing. A few remarks on suﬃciency conditions are
reported in the Appendix.
3.3.3 The Size of a Product
If a unique non-linear pricing equilibrium exists, it is described by (3.1)-(3.2).
A well-behaved equilibrium in this context has the following characteristics:
c < x∗1 < x
∗
2 < 1
or, in other words, the market is segmented between consumers who choose
the one unit packets and others who choose the two unit packets. Proposition
1 establishes when this is the case. Before that, however, it is necessary to
introduce a further piece of notation. Define the following expression as:
ψ(b) = 1− 2− b
2c
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Moreover, define also:
ϑ(b) =
b
2
+
1− F
¡
2θ−1
b−1 c
¢
f
¡
2θ−1
b−1 c
¢ (2− b)(b− 1)
2
The following result on the size of products supplied under non-linear pricing
can be now stated.
Proposition 1 (i) Suppose θ ≥ ϑ(b), then a non-linear pricing equilibrium
in which c < x∗1 < x
∗
2 < 1 is the outcome of firms’ profit maximization prob-
lem. (ii) If θ ≤ ψ(b), then the non-linear pricing equilibrium is characterized
by c < x∗∗1 ≡ x∗∗2 < 1.
The proposition provides suﬃcient conditions on the parameters to re-
gister a well-behaved equilibrium. In that case both one and two unit packets
are supplied, which is exactly when the inequality θ ≥ ϑ(b) holds. However,
the proposition is also providing a suﬃcient condition under which a corner
solution is found: if θ ≤ ψ(b), then all firms will supply only two-unit packets
and not the one-unit ones.
The intuition for the result in Proposition 1 is that firms in equilibrium
choose to supply both sizes packets (one and two units) when the eﬀect of
size economies (θ) is not too intense relative to the consumers’ valuation of a
second unit of product (b). In other words, when the cost savings related to
size economies are relatively important, firms find it optimal to supply only
two-units packets.
The parameter space (bOθ) results then split into several areas by the
relations derived: non-linear pricing equilibria with diﬀerent properties will
take place for diﬀerent combinations of parameters. It is not possible however
to completely identify equilibria. For example, it is a priori not possible to
predict what characteristics the equilibria will have when the parameters
satisfy:
ψ(b) < θ < ϑ(b)
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The linear pricing equilibrium also deserves an accurate analysis. A linear
pricing equilibrium is described by (3.3) and x01 = (b− 1)x02. A well-behaved
linear pricing equilibrium requires:
c < x01 < x
0
2 < 1
As pointed out by Cheung-Wang[14] this needs not always to be the case. The
same applies to the model presented here. Define the following expression
as:
φ(b) =
nc(b− 1)f(b− 1) + (b− 1)2f(b− 1)[1− F (b− 1)]+
2f(1){nc+ (b− 1)[1− F (b− 1)]}
−n[(b− 1)2f(b− 1)− F (1)]
2f(1){nc+ (b− 1)[1− F (b− 1)]} +
1
2
The function φ(b) determines the size of products supplied under linear pri-
cing:
Proposition 2 Suppose θ > φ(b), then the linear pricing equilibrium is char-
acterized by c < x01 < x
0
2 < 1. If θ ≤ φ(b), then the linear pricing equilibrium
is characterized by c < x001 < x
00
2 = 1.
Proposition 2 states that a well behaved equilibrium in which firms supply
both one and two unit packets is found if θ > φ(b). A diﬀerent scenario,
however, takes place if θ ≤ φ(b): only one-unit packets, then, can be found on
the market. The function φ(b) can be reformulated in terms of the marginal
cost of production c to allow a more intuitive interpretation of the result of
Proposition 24:
c < c∗ =
(b− 1)2f(b− 1)− f(1)
(b− 1)f(b− 1)− (2θ − 1)f(1) −
(b− 1)[1− F (b− 1)]
n
4An analogous result is obtained by Cheung-Wang[14] in the context of the original
model.
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In other words, when firms choose linear pricing there exist a threshold value
c∗ of the marginal cost over which the firms do not find profitable to produce
and sell two units packets.
The results obtained identify two regions in which the parameters space
is split: (
if θ ≤ φ(b) : c ≥ c∗ ⇒ q = 1 only
if θ > φ(b) : c < c∗ ⇒ q = 1, 2
The intuition for the results presented is clear using the latest interpretation
of φ(b): under linear pricing a threshold value for the unit cost exists below
which firms find it optimal to supply both one and two unit packets and
above which only one unit packets are supplied.
3.3.4 Size and Pricing Regime
The results in the previous section have shown how the size of products
supplied by firms may vary depending on the relevant characteristics of the
demand and supply parameters and the pricing regime chosen by firms. It
is then possible to state the conditions under which firms provide products
under diﬀerent price regimes. This point is well illustrated by taking a linear
demand function. In this case, the condition θ R φ(b) in Section 3.3.3 can
be expressed as:
θ R nc(b− 1) + (b− 1)
2(2− b) + nb(2− b)
2[nc+ (b− 1)(2− b)] +
1
2
As Figure 3.3 witnesses for plausible combinations of c and n, the purple
function θ = φ(b) is downward sloping.
Even simpler is the case of non-linear pricing. If the distribution is uniform,
the relation θ ≥ ϑ(b) becomes:
θ ≥ b
2 − 4b+ bc− 2c+ 2
2(cb− 2c− 1)
The relation θ ≤ ψ(b) does not change and it is clearly an increasing function
of b. The functions are depicted in Figure 3.3 in yellow and green respectively.
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Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 provide results about the size of products
supplied under non-linear and linear pricing. In this context, they give rise
to four types of equilibrium regions characterized by diﬀerent combinations
of products sizes and prices depending on the price regime.
Table 3.2 Parameters and Types of Equilibria
θ ≤ φ(b) θ > φ(b)
θ ≥ ϑ(b) Type 1 Type 2
θ ≤ ψ(b) Type 3 Type 4
Type1 equilibria is the parameter subspace for which firms supply the
product in diﬀerent sizes under non-linear pricing while under linear they
commercialize the product in only one unit size. The characteristics of this
equilibria were also found by Cheung-Wang[14] of which this region of para-
meter constitutes a generalization. It is located in the north-western part of
Figure 3.3. Type 2 equilibria are characterized by the product being supplied
in packets of diﬀerent sizes, no matter the pricing regime. This is the general-
ization of the well behaved type of setting considered by Ireland[38] and can
be graphically identified in the small triangle in the north-east of Figure 3.3.
Type 3 equilibria are rather particular: under both price regimes a corner
solution takes place. Under non-linear pricing firms focus on supplying a
large size product while under linear pricing commercialize the product in a
single unit. This happens in the south-eastern part of Figure 3.3. In Type 4
equilibria firms still supply only product in large size packets but they supply
two diﬀerent sizes of product under linear pricing. In graphical terms, it can
be identified in the eastern part of Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the space of the parameters of the model bOθ for
n = 3 and c = 0.25 and the partition deriving from results of Proposition
1 and Proposition 2. The existence of a ‘cone’ of ‘a priori ’ non identifiable
equilibria can be noticed between the yellow and green schedules.
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Figure 3.3: Equilibrium Regions for n = 3 and c = 0.25.
3.4 Output, Profit and Welfare Analysis
In this section, the analysis of the model’s results is presented. Not all types
of equilibrium regions are analyzed completely and independently; the most
important results, instead, are outlined in each subsection. The complete
characterization of all equilibrium regions can be found in Appendix 3.6.
3.4.1 Generalizing Cheung-Wang
Cheung-Wang[14] pointed out that firms may not always want to supply both
packets under linear pricing. When the parameters of demand and cost func-
tion are such that under linear pricing it is optimal to supply only one-unit
packets, then firms have profit advantages to practice non-linear prices. Fur-
thermore this also drives to a Pareto-superior equilibrium: both firms and
consumers are better oﬀ in the latest situation. These features also charac-
terize Type 1 equilibrium.
Proposition 3 states the relations between non-linear and linear pricing equi-
librium:
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Proposition 3 Equilibria of Type 1, when θ > ψ(b) and θ ≤ φ(b), are
characterized by:
1.
x∗1 ≡ x001 ∀x ∈ [0, 1] (3.5)
2.
QNLP ≥ QLP ∀x ∈ [0, 1]
3.
πNLP ≥ πLP ∀x ∈ [0, 1]
4.
CSNLP ≥ CSLP ∀x ∈ [0, 1]
This is a general and strong result: according to (3.5) the marginal cus-
tomer choosing to consume one unit is the same under non-linear and linear
pricing. This obviously implies that the total output is always larger under
non-linear pricing, under which both one and two unit packets are supplied.
Moreover and more importantly, not only firms’ profits but also consumers’
surplus are always higher under non-linear pricing in this case.
These conclusions are the exact generalization of Proposition 6 in Cheung-
Wang[14], that proves to be robust to the extension presented, featuring size
economies. If price-discrimination allows to sell products in diﬀerent sizes,
then it has overall positive welfare eﬀects. The result stated parallels a very
well known result concerning third degree price discrimination: this practice
can be welfare enhancing in situations in which it allows to serve a share of
demand that would stay out of the market if a uniform price were practiced.
3.4.2 Are Ireland’s Results Robust?
Equilibria of Type 2 are a generalization of Ireland’s benchmark: his analysis
is encompassed as a special case θ = 1. Under both pricing regimes all firms
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supply both the one and the two unit packets (as both θ ≥ ϑ(b) and θ > φ(b)
hold). This allows an important comparison with the results of Ireland[38]
and a deeper analysis of the role played by size economies in this particular
model and, more generally, with respect to the practice of non-linear pricing.
The equilibrium expressions for the non-linear and the linear pricing case are
summarized in Appendix 3.6 while the main results regarding this case are
stated in the following:
Proposition 4 In Type 2 equilibrium with linear demand: (i) a larger share
of customers is served with one-unit packets under linear pricing while under
non-linear pricing a larger share of two-unit packets is supplied; (ii) the total
output is the same under both pricing regimes; (iii) firms’ profits are always
larger under non-linear pricing.
Two observations about the above results are in order. First, since the
total output is constant in both equilibria, the output of each firm should
be as well, i.e. ∆Qi = 0. Now, decomposing the output change in its
components:
∆Qi = 2∆(
1− x2
n
) +∆(
x2 − x1
n
) = 0
it can be noticed that not only the two components must have opposite signs
[which was known from Point (i)] but the increase in the share of consumers
served with one-unit packets under linear prices has to be twice as big as
the decrease in the share of consumers buying two-units packets once firms
switch from non-linear to linear pricing.
Second, the results of Ireland original model about economy’s total output
and firms’ profits are robust and hold in the case production displays size
economies: output is constant and profits are always higher under non-linear
pricing. This property is quite relevant since it is driving Ireland[38] results
in the benchmark model: non-linear pricing is welfare dominated since, in
the linear demand case, it does not provide an output expansion eﬀect.
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Figure 3.4: Consumers’ Surplus Diﬀerential in Type 2 Equilibrium.
There are no immediate analytical conclusions that can be derived for
what regards the comparison between consumers’ surplus and social welfare
under non-linear and linear pricing. It is possible, however, to get insights
from simulation evidence. Consider first the diﬀerential between consumers’
surplus in the two situations(non-linear vs. linear):
∆CS = CS∗ − CS0 = [b− 2 + 2cn(θ − 1)][(2− b)(1 + 2n) + 2cn(θ − 1)]
2b(n+ 1)2
A priori the expression can not be signed. Fixing the values of n and c at
plausible levels, though, the relation ∆CS can be interpreted as a function
of θ and b. Figure 3.4 illustrates the point: the chosen parameters are n = 3
and c = 0.25.
Only negative values of the function are represented in the graph while
positive combinations are left blank. Inspection of the relevant region, the
eastern, confirms that the function is negative for all combinations of para-
meters. This leads to the following remark:
Remark 1 Ireland’s conclusion that consumers are better-oﬀ if non-linear
prices are prohibited is robust to the extension of the model allowing for size
economies.
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Figure 3.5: Social Welfare Diﬀerential in Type 2 Equilibria.
The same, though, does not hold for social welfare: as Figure 3.5 makes
clear, the gains in profits under non-linear pricing more than compensate the
losses suﬀered by consumers and ∆W results to be positive in the relevant
region defining Type 2 equilibria.
The intuition for this result, that is in contrast with Ireland’s conclusions,
is that non-linear pricing imposes no restrictions on firms, allowing them to
be more flexible and eﬀective in taking advantage of the cost savings deriving
from size economies.
Remark 2 In presence of size economies on the supply side, the higher flex-
ibility allowed by non-linear pricing implies a gain in eﬃciency which more
than oﬀset the losses imposed on consumers.
In conclusion, when firms find convenient to supply the product in diﬀer-
ent sizes no matter the price regime, consumers always result damaged while
overall welfare may be enhanced as non-linear pricing allow more flexibility
in taking advantage of economies related to the size of the product.
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3.4.3 Output Eﬀects
As underlined, in Type 1 equilibrium, output expansion under non-linear
pricing implies a welfare gain. A similar result is obtained in Type 3 equilib-
rium, however the intuition is quite diﬀerent. If θ ≤ ψ(b) then only two-unit
packets of the good are sold under non-linear pricing while as θ ≤ φ(b) only
one-unit packets are sold under linear pricing. This type of equilibrium is
obviously quite peculiar as the pricing regimes drive to corner solution which
imply the presence on the market of only one packet of goods: either large
or small. The following result is obtained:
Proposition 5 Assuming the demand function is linear, in Type 3 equi-
librium: (i) the share of consumers served with two units under non-linear
pricing is larger than the share supplied with one unit packets under linear
pricing; (ii) total output is larger under non-linear pricing.
The result can be contrasted with the received literature: while output
expansion under non-linear pricing is often achieved by expanding the share
of customers served, as illustrated for example by Type 1 equilibrium, in this
case output increases despite firms are serving an identical share of demand
under both regimes. To summarize:
Remark 3 In Type 3 equilibria the share of consumers served remains con-
stant while the output is expanded under non-linear pricing.
The discussion of the profit, consumers’ surplus and welfare implications
of this result is delayed to the next section.
Turning to Type 4 equilibrium, one more interesting result is available
regarding the output and the share of consumers’ served. If θ ≤ ψ(b) then
only two-unit packets of the good are supplied under non-linear pricing while
as θ > φ(b) then both one and two-unit packets are sold under linear pricing.
The following results is obtained:
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Proposition 6 In Type 4 equilibrium with linear demand: (i) a larger share
of customers is served with two-unit packets under non-linear pricing than
under linear; (ii) total output is larger under non-linear pricing.
The striking feature of this result is that, despite the fact that firms supply
both the one and two unit packets under linear-pricing, total output is larger
under non-linear pricing. This is due to the fact that a larger share of two-unit
packets is supplied under non-linear pricing. This eﬀect is not compensated
by the one-unit packets that are oﬀered only under linear pricing. The price
flexibility allowed by non-linear pricing and the more extreme demand and
supply conditions encourage firms to specialize on the two unit packets and
this has a positive eﬀect on overall output.
3.4.4 A Prisoner’s Dilemma?
Type 3 equilibria are interesting for the peculiar configuration of packets
supplied, for the output results but also for the profit eﬀects. In the previous
section it was shown that if firms supply two unit packets under non-linear
pricing while only one unit under linear pricing then overall output is expan-
ded. However, this does not imply that the profits of firms are necessarily
larger under non-linear pricing. To illustrate the point, as in Section 3.4.2,
the strategy of fixing plausible values of the parameters c and n is adopted.
Figure 3.5 represents ∆π, the diﬀerential between profits under non-linear
and linear pricing. The relevant region for this case is the southern part:
for n = 3 the function is mainly positive, apart for the half moon shaped
region in the south-eastern part of the figure, representing rather extreme
combinations of parameters. The negative area expands as n increases5: a
general conclusion, then, on the profit eﬀects can not be reached.
The uncertainty over the profit eﬀects of non-linear pricing, however,
5The results of simulations for diﬀerent values of n and c are available upon request
from the author.
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Figure 3.6: Profit Diﬀerential in Type 3 Equilibria.
highlights a very interesting mechanism related to the oligopolistic nature of
the model. The model encompasses a monopolistic market structure. The
only profit maximizing firm should always be able to do at least as well using
non-linear pricing: that strategy, in fact, encompasses linear pricing in the
limit. This needs not to be the case as the number of firms increases. The
reason why non-linear pricing may be dominated by linear pricing is related
to very last nature of firms’ maximizand function: according to Bergstrom-
Varian[8] this is a combination of aggregate consumer surplus and aggregate
profits. Following that approach, Ireland[38] shows that the function firms
maximize, G(Y ) can be written as:
G(Y ) =
(n− 1)CS + nπ
n
(3.6)
This specification, mutatis mutandis6, is robust to the extended version of
the model considered here. Ireland[38] insight is that, as G(Y ) is maxim-
ized freely in a non-linear pricing equilibrium and G(Y ) is maximized under
6The expressions of aggregate consumers surplus and profit are diﬀerent in this case:
this does not aﬀect the validity of the analysis.
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Figure 3.7: Consumers’ Surplus Diﬀerential in Equilibria of Type 3.
constraints in the linear pricing equilibrium, then necessarily the following
relation holds:
G(Y NLP ) > G(Y LP )
assuming the constraint is strictly binding. As the consumer surplus is always
higher in a linear pricing equilibrium, equation (3.6) implies that profit must
be higher in the non-linear pricing one. As shown by Figure 3.7, in the
case analyzed here consumers surplus is always higher in a non-linear pricing
equilibrium, so the relation between profits π∗ and π0 can go either way,
without this fact compromising the logical consistency of the model.
The intuition behind this result is that strategic interaction may determ-
ine all firms ending up in a sub-optimal outcome: this is due to the externality
they exercise on each other when maximizing their profits. The results ob-
tained imply that in case production is characterized by size economies and
firms supply only one type of packet under each price regime, firms may face
a prisoners’ dilemma being better oﬀ in case they can commit not to use
non-linear pricing.
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3.4.5 Welfare Eﬀects
A few comments deserve the overall welfare results of the analysis conducted.
Suppose the regulator assigns the same weight to firms’ profits than to the
consumers’ surplus. In all the equilibrium types identified is then possible to
join conclusions on the overall welfare eﬀect of non-linear pricing as opposed
to linear pricing. Although not always the analytical results are conclus-
ive, one feature of allowing production to display economies related to the
size of the product is that these might help non-linear pricing to be welfare
enhancing. Under non-linear pricing, in fact, firms are more eﬃcient in tak-
ing advantage of the characteristics of the supply side and this has positive
eﬀects that are reflected in the social welfare as a whole. As far as Type
1 and Type 4 equilibria are concerned, welfare enhancement is linked to a
positive eﬀect of non-linear pricing on both profits and consumers’ surplus,
allowing to identify a Pareto superior equilibrium. Things are not quite as
straightforward in case of Type 2 and Type 3 equilibria. In Type 2 equilibria,
however, the eﬀect of size economies allows firms’ gains in profits to more
than compensate consumers’ losses under non-linear pricing. The opposite
happens in Type 3 equilibria when possible firms’ losses are compensated by
a positive eﬀects on the consumers’ surplus. The conclusion of this analysis
is then that non-linear pricing is very likely to improve overall welfare un-
less products would be supplied in several sizes also under linear pricing. In
that case, non-linear pricing can be still welfare enhancing but only in case
economies of size are important enough.
3.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter provided a theoretical analysis of the size of the products that
firms propose to consumers on the market. The interpretation put forward
relies on two main elements: the first is the pricing regime and the second is
the role of the economies related to the size of the product.
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If firms can price non-linearly bundles of diﬀerent size, then either both
the small and the large size packets or only a very large size can be found
on the market. Whether the firm focuses only on the production of the large
packets or not is linked to the consumers’ evaluation of the good and to the
extent of cost savings linked to the production of the larger size.
On the other hand, if firms stick to linear pricing, they are either selling
the product in a single unit or in packets of both sizes. Firms are focusing
on production of only one unit of the good when the unit production costs
are relatively high.
These results allow to identify four possible type of market outcomes,
depending on whether firms are pricing linearly or non-linearly. In Type 1
equilibria firms supply only packets of one unit under linear pricing while
both packets when non-linear pricing is the strategy adopted. In Type 2
equilibria both sizes of product are available on the market, no matter the
pricing regime. In Type 3 equilibria, firms only supply the large size under
non-linear pricing while they limit themselves to produce the small size under
linear pricing. In Type 4 equilibria, finally, firms supply the large size only
under non-linear pricing while both sizes under linear pricing. The analysis
of the property of the four equilibrium types provides interesting results on
pricing, output, profits, consumers’ surplus and social welfare. The main
conclusions can be summarized in the following table:
Table 3.3 Comparison of Non-Linear Pricing to Linear Pricing in
diﬀerent types of equilibria
∆Q ∆Π ∆CS ∆W
Type 1 + + + +
Type 2 = + - +
Type 3 + +/- + +
Type 4 + + + +
It is clear from Table 3.3 that when firm do not supply the large unit
packets under linear pricing, consumers are always worse oﬀ. This is linked
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to the overall output restrictions taking place under linear pricing in this
case. A noticeable result is that in Type 3 equilibria output increases despite
being constant the share of consumers served and participating in the market.
An interesting feature displayed by the same region is that for some para-
meters’ combinations profits may be lower under non-linear pricing, despite
linear pricing being a special case of the former. The result is linked to the
existence of the oligopoly externality: the results highlights how an oligopoly
externality is at work also in a Cournot-like model of non-linear pricing. Fi-
nally, considering the possibility that firms enjoy economies related to the size
of the products produced highlights that non-linear pricing is usually welfare
enhancing. Moreover, in most types of equilibria discussed non-linear pricing
is likely to be preferred by all agents involved in the economy.
The chapter proposes one of the first analysis of the interaction between
the demand and technology sides of the market under non-linear pricing and
derives the recalled results. However, this contribution might be seen as a
first step in the study of what determines the size of the products that arrive
on the market. Firstly, the analysis proposed is confined to the case of a small
and a large size packets: the model, however, is easily extended to encompass
the case of a generic number of packets of diﬀerent sizes being sold. Secondly,
the analysis has very strong empirical predictions which maybe worth to
be addressed by gathering suitable data on the phenomenon. Thirdly, an
interesting result is that the oligopolistic externality is present in the model
and this may see firms ending up with a lower profits when they have more
pricing flexibility. It would be desirable, in a later stage to characterize the
complete payoﬀmatrix of the game faced by firms. This would allow to verify
whether and under which conditions firms face a prisoners’ dilemma type of
situation: both would like to commit to linear pricing but they end up in a
dominated non-linear pricing equilibrium. Finally, it is often observed that
the same product is sold both in packets of diﬀerent sizes and in a larger
packet of one size too. One example is provided by beer or crisps: both
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a pack with several cans or small packets and a large bottle or packet are
often sold at the same time. This type of situation is not encompassed in
our model but it would be interesting to be tackled in future research.
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3.6 Appendix: All Equilibrium Regions
This appendix presents the equilibrium expressions identifying all equilibrium
regions discussed in the chapter.
The first equilibrium configuration is characterized by both packets sup-
plied under non-linear pricing (as θ ≥ ϑ(b)) and only the one-unit packets
under linear pricing (as θ ≤ φ(b)): it constitutes the generalization of Type
1 equilibrium of Cheung-Wang[14]. The equilibrium is described by the fol-
lowing tables.
Table 4 reports the equilibrium values when firms practice non-linear pricing:
Table 3.4 Non-Linear Pricing Equilibrium of Type 1
x∗1
1+cn
1+n
x∗2
(b−1)+nc(2θ−1)
(b−1)(n+1)
Q∗ n{2[(b−1)−c(θ−1)]−cb}
(b−1)(n+1)
π∗i
b2−b+bc2−4θc[(b−1)+(1−θ)c]
(n+1)2(b−1)
CS∗ n
2{b2−b+bc2−4θc[(b−1)+(1−θ)c]}
2(n+1)2(b−1)
Table 5 reports the equilibrium variables in case linear pricing are chosen
by all firms:
Table3. 5 Linear Pricing Equilibrium of Type 1
x001
1+cn
n+1
x002 @
Q00 n(1−c)
(n+1)
π00i
(1−c)2
(n+1)2
CS00 n
2(1−c)2
2(n+1)2
The second type of equilibrium is a generalization of Ireland’s benchmark
case: his analysis is encompassed as a special case θ = 1. Under both pricing
regimes all firms supply both the one and the two unit packets (as both
θ ≥ ϑ(b) and θ > φ(b) hold).
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The equilibrium expressions for the non-linear and the linear pricing case are
summarized in the following tables:
Table 3.6 Non-Linear Pricing Equilibrium of Type 2
x∗1
1+cn
1+n
x∗2
(b−1)+nc(2θ−1)
(b−1)(n+1)
Q∗ n{2[(b−1)−c(θ−1)]−cb}
(b−1)(n+1)
π∗i
b2−b+bc2−4θc[(b−1)+(1−θ)c]
(n+1)2(b−1)
CS∗ n
2{b2−b+bc2−4θc[(b−1)+(1−θ)c]}
2(n+1)2(b−1)
Table 3.7 Linear Pricing Equilibrium of Type 2
x01
2(b−1)+cn(b+2θ−2)
b(n+1)
x02
2(b−1)+cn(b+2θ−2)
b(b−1)(n+1)
Q0 n{2[(b−1)−c(θ−1)]−cb}
(b−1)(n+1)
π0i
4c+4cn+4n−8bn−6cb+2cb2+4b2n−6cbn+2cb2n+2bc2θ2n
b(b−1)n(n+1)2
−2b2cθ−4ncθ−4cθ+10nbcθ+6bcθ−6nb2cθ+2n2bc2θ2
b(b−1)n(n+1)2
−n2b2c2θ2−2c2bn2θ+c2n2b2θ−2c2bnθ+c2b2nθ
b(b−1)n(n+1)2
CS0 b
3+2b3n+b3n2−10b2n−b2n2−5b2+b2c2n2θ2+
2b(b−1)(n+1)2
−4b2n2cθ+16bn+8b+4bcn2θ−8n−4
2b(b−1)(n+1)2
Type 3 equilibrium is original and peculiar at the same time: in both
linear and non-linear pricing, under the given combinations of the relevant
parameters, firms do not find it profitable to supply both packets. In a sense,
no price discrimination exists in equilibrium under either one price regime
or the other; the shape of the equilibrium is nevertheless determined by the
degree of price freedom firms enjoys.
Only two-units packets are on the market under non-linear pricing as
θ ≤ ψ(b) and as the following table describing this equilibrium makes clear:
Table 3.8 Non-Linear Pricing Equilibrium of Type 3
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x∗∗1 @
x∗∗2
(b−1)+nc(2θ−1)
(b−1)(n+1)
Q∗∗ 2n[(b−1)−(2θ−1)c]
(b−1)(n+1)
π∗∗i
[(b−1)−(2θ−1)c](b2−b−bcn−2θcb+2θc+2θcn)
(n+1)2(b−1)2
CS∗∗ bn
2[(b−1)−(2θ−1)c]2
2(n+1)2(b−1)2
whereas, only one-unit packets are oﬀered under linear pricing as and as
it can be seen in the table below.
Table 3.9 Linear Pricing Equilibrium of Type 3
x001
1+cn
n+1
x002 @
Q00 n(1−c)
(n+1)
π00i
(1−c)2
(n+1)2
CS00 n
2(1−c)2
2(n+1)2
In Type 4 equilibrium firms supply only two-unit packets under non-linear
pricing since the condition θ ≤ ψ(b) holds. Under linear pricing, nevertheless
both one and two-unit packets are supplied as the relation θ > φ(b) is verified.
The expressions characterizing the non-linear pricing equilibrium are sum-
marized in the following table:
Table 3.10 Non-Linear Pricing Equilibrium of Type 4
x∗∗1 @
x∗∗2
(b−1)+nc(2θ−1)
(b−1)(n+1)
Q∗∗ 2n[(b−1)−(2θ−1)c]
(b−1)(n+1)
π∗∗i
[(b−1)−(2θ−1)c](b2−b−bcn−2θcb+2θc+2θcn)
(n+1)2(b−1)2
CS∗∗ bn
2[(b−1)−(2θ−1)c]2
2(n+1)2(b−1)2
The equilibrium when linear prices are practiced is characterized by the
expressions reported in Table 3.11:
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Table 3.11 Linear Pricing Equilibrium of Type 4
x01
2(b−1)+cn(b+2θ−2)
b(n+1)
x02
2(b−1)+cn(b+2θ−2)
b(b−1)(n+1)
Q0 n{2[(b−1)−c(θ−1)]−cb}
(b−1)(n+1)
π0i
4c+4cn+4n−8bn−6cb+2cb2+4b2n−6cbn+2cb2n+2bc2θ2n
b(b−1)n(n+1)2
−2b2cθ−4ncθ−4cθ+10nbcθ+6bcθ−6nb2cθ+2n2bc2θ2
b(b−1)n(n+1)2
−n2b2c2θ2−2c2bn2θ+c2n2b2θ−2c2bnθ+c2b2nθ
b(b−1)n(n+1)2
CS0 b
3+2b3n+b3n2−10b2n−b2n2−5b2+b2c2n2θ2+
2b(b−1)(n+1)2
−4b2n2cθ+16bn+8b+4bcn2θ−8n−4
2b(b−1)(n+1)2
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3.7 Appendix: Proofs
This appendix contains the proofs of Proposition 1 to Proposition 6.
Proof of Proposition 1 It is firstly established that firms do not price
below marginal cost. To prove that x∗1 > c and x
∗
2 >
(2θ−1)c
(b−1) notice that x
∗
1
and x∗2 are defined respectively by FOCNLP1(x) = 0 and FOCNLP2(x) = 0.
If second order conditions are met, (3.1)-(3.2) are also monotonically decreas-
ing in x. Now, since FOCNLP1(c) =
1−F (c)
n > 0 and FOCNLP2(
(2θ−1)c
b−1 ) =
1−F [ (2θ−1)c
(b−1) ]
n > 0, the claim is verified.
Part (i) has then to be proven: if θ ≥ ϑ(b) then x∗1 < x∗2. Consider the
function:
Ω(x) = FOCNLP2(x)− FOCNLP1(x)
for a generic, given x. Notice first that by assumptions, both FOCNLP1(x)
and FOCNLP2(x) are continuous and weakly decreasing in x. Moreover, it
can be shown that FOCNLP1(x) is decreasing at a higher rate than FOCNLP2(x);
having defined Ξ(x) = SOCNLP2(x)−SOCNLP1(x) it is verified that: Ξ(x) >
0 ∀x ∈ [0, 1].
By algebraic manipulations, it is found that Ω(x)|x=2θ−1b−1 c ≥ 0 ⇔ θ ≥ ϑ(b).
As FOCNLP1(x) is decreasing at a faster rate, this is suﬃcient to ensure that
x s.t. {FOCNLP2(x) = 0} > x s.t.{FOCNLP1 = 0} which is equivalent to say
x∗2 > x
∗
1.
As to part (ii), it is be derived that: Ω(x)|x=1 ≤ 0 ⇔ θ ≤ ψ(b). This a
suﬃcient condition to ensure that the equilibrium collapses to x∗∗1 ≡ x∗∗2
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2 The first inequality (c < x01 ) is showed to hold
by checking that FOCLP [c/(b − 1)] > 0 and noticing that also FOCLP (x)
is monotonically decreasing in x. The second inequality (x01 < x
0
2)is verified
by definition. To see that the last inequality holds notice that x02 < 1 if and
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only if FOCLP (1) < 0 which requires:
FOCLP (1) = −(b− 1)[(b− 1)− c]f(b− 1)− f(1)[(b− 1)− (2θ − 1)c] +
+
(b− 1)
n
[1− F (b− 1)] < 0
This inequality can be expressed as a relation between θ and b:
θ >
nc(b− 1)f(b− 1) + (b− 1)2f(b− 1)[1− F (b− 1)]+
2f(1){nc+ (b− 1)[1− F (b− 1)]}
−n[(b− 1)2f(b− 1)− F (1)]
2f(1){nc+ (b− 1)[1− F (b− 1)]} +
1
2
= φ(b)
x002 ≡ 1 in case θ ≤ φ(b) Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3 Point 1. derives by simply observing that x∗1
and x01 are identified by the same first order condition:
x1 s.t.
1− F (x1)
n
− f(x1)(x1 − c) = 0
this, in turn, implies they coincide. Point 2. and 3. are direct implications
of the result in 1. while 4. is the result of direct comparison between the
equilibrium expressions of the consumers’ surplus under non-linear and linear
pricing. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4 Point (i) descends from direct comparisons
of the equilibrium expressions for the choice variables. First of all, ∆x2 =
x∗2 − x02 ≤ 0 and is equal zero only in the extreme case b = 1. Furthermore,
once again by direct comparison, it is obtained ∆x1 = x∗1−x01 > 0 under the
assumptions made on the parameters. These results imply that the share of
customers served with two-units packets is (weakly) larger under non-linear
pricing:
1− x∗2 ≥ 1− x02
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while, under linear pricing, is larger the share of consumers buying the one-
unit packet:
x∗2 − x∗1 < x02 − x01
Point (ii) is immediate by looking at Q∗ and Q0. Point (iii) comes from
observing that ∆πi = π∗i − π0i > 0 for all the combinations of the relevant
parameters. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5 Since, by direct comparison, x001 ≥ x∗∗2 it is
immediate that both Point (i) and (ii) are verified. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6 Point (i) follows by direct comparison: ∆x2 =
x∗∗2 − x02 ≤ 0 and it is equal to zero only in the special case b = 2 and θ = 1.
From this, it is immediate to see that 1− x∗∗2 is larger than 1− x02.
As to point (ii), direct comparison and the restriction θ ≤ ψ(b) allow to show
that ∆Q = Q∗∗−Q0 ≥ 0 for all the feasible combinations of the parameters,
so that the output under non-linear pricing results larger or at least equal to
the one under linear prices. Q.E.D.
Chapter 4
Network Neutrality and the
Non-Discrimination Issue
4.1 Introduction
Network neutrality is the word used to refer to the debate over the manage-
ment and regulation of the internet in the future1.
The relevance of this industry has grown dramatically in the recent past
and it is clear the importance of managing the development of the sector
eﬀectively. Nevertheless, many economics issue arise when considering the
broadband internet industry and this feature complicates attempts to outline
a widely supported regulatory policy.
The ultimate goal of a network neutrality regulation is to guarantee compet-
ition and innovation on the internet. The key to achieve this goal seems to
have been identified by the proponents of state intervention in the protection
principles of inter-operability and non-discrimination.
Inter-operability has to do with the degree of homogeneity of the networks
owned by diﬀerent companies or institutions. On one side, the homogen-
eity of networks guarantees identical opportunities to all customers and the
1An overview of the topic is provided by Economides [23]-[24].
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compatibility of communications between all networks. On the other end,
some authors suggest that the diﬀerentiation of networks could benefit cus-
tomers by favouring an eﬃcient specialization on diﬀerent internet services.
A typical example is provided by e-mail as opposed to VOIP services: those
applications have very diﬀerent technical requirements in their supply and
also very diﬀerent priority for the success of the service.
Non discrimination deals with the possibility of networks’ owners of version-
ing the access to the services from both content providers and final users.
According to a recent quote, this issue strongly characterize the whole de-
bate: ‘Network Neutrality is the term commonly used to describe the battle
between the telecom industry and a varied coalition of groups arguing over
whether content providers should be able to pay in order for surfers to get
faster access to their sites’(ABC News, 23/06/06).
The two recalled issues are, clearly, strongly interrelated. This chapter, how-
ever, focuses on non-discrimination and oﬀers a possible interpretation of the
economic implications of the evolution of the network neutrality debate. In
particular, an assessment of the implications of diﬀerent pricing and quality
supply policies from the network owners is provided.
According to Sidak[71] «the analysis of optional tariﬀs sheds light on the
network neutrality debate. A network operator could oﬀer content providers
one tariﬀ schedule for priority delivery of data packets and another tariﬀ
schedule for unprioritized delivery». The same author put forward the ar-
gument of Ramsey pricing to conclude that: «diﬀerential pricing for content
providers for the priority delivery of packets is a Pareto improvement over a
‘neutrality’ regime that required that a single price be charged». One of the
aims of this chapter is to show that whereas most of the usual intuition from
non-linear pricing theory carries on when analyzing a stylized but specific
model on the non-discrimination issue, there are circumstances over which
results can be controverted. These circumstances depend in fact on the very
specific features of the demand side of the market but also the supply side
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and the essential two-sidedness nature of the internet.
The approach adopted in this chapter diﬀers from most of the literature
quoted, whose approach characterizes much of the debate on network neut-
rality. More rare are economics contribution on the issue. The two more
closely related papers are Economides-Tag[25] and Hermalin-Katz[44]. Both
contribution recognize the two-sided nature of the internet and focus on the
economics eﬀects of an eventual network neutrality regulation. However,
Economides-Tag[25] does not focus on issues related to quality of network
access. Their approach can be seen as a short run analysis of the impact
of network neutrality regulation, as it is very unlikely that in the short run
the network owners can introduce improvements to the internet, allowing to
oﬀer a diﬀerentiated product to content providers. Hermalin-Katz[44], in-
stead, focus exactly on supply of quality as the screening device adopted by
owners to discriminate providers with diﬀerent willingness to pay. The spirit
and the approach of their paper is quite close to this one, as it is recognized
in the long run networks can be improved and network neutrality regulation
may have an eﬀect on quality supply. However, the two papers diﬀer in many
respect. First, our specification naturally deals with the oligopolistic mar-
ket structure which seems to characterize the broadband internet industry.
Second, the richer framework adopted in this chapter allows to focus on sev-
eral aspects that the contribution of Hermalin-Katz[44] does not address, as
for example network externalities. Finally, while Hermalin-Katz[44] focus on
whether neutrality is superior or not to discrimination, this chapter high-
lights which market fundamentals play in favour of network neutrality and
which ones against regulation.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 provides an
extremely synthetic and non-exhaustive overview of the network neutrality
debate. Section 4.3 introduces the model and its relation with the economics
literature. Section 4.4 provides an overview and an illustration of the two
situations analyzed: a network neutral benchmark case and an equilibrium
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in which network owners are allowed to oﬀer diﬀerent qualities of access to
the internet to diﬀerent content providers. Section 4.5 analyzes the model by
discussing the role of demand and supply characteristics on both sides of the
market in determining the eﬀect of network neutrality regulation. Section
4.6 provides a few concluding remarks.
4.2 The Network Neutrality Debate
In extreme synthesis the non-discrimination problem can be summarized in
the two following questions. Should network owners be able to discriminate
content providers? Or should the openness and democracy of the web be
preserved?
Before turning to the analysis of these specific questions, a synthetic sum-
mary of the network neutrality debate is provided.
Wu[80] categorizes the actors of the whole network neutrality debate as
"Openists vs. Deregulationists". Broadly speaking,‘openists’ highlight that
the success of the internet built on the ‘innovation commons’ principle, which
is the possibility of everyone to access everyone else’s advances. This can only
be achieved by a public network/infrastructure on which interconnections are
guaranteed by creative users and developers. Telecom companies should not
be allowed to appropriate the great value of the positive externalities existing
throughout the web. This principle suggests favour for a regulation guaran-
teeing network neutrality. Ingram[37] cites among network neutrality sup-
porters companies like Google, Yahoo!, Ebay, Amazon and Microsoft. On the
other end, ‘deregulationists’ seem to refer to the idea of ‘media-convergence’,
according to which there is a «natural technological progression towards a
single network for communications services2». This convergence can be eﬃ-
ciently achieved by guaranteeing property over diﬀerent network for diﬀerent
services. Coupled with deregulation, this seems the only way to guarantee
2Wu[80], pp.71-79.
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an eﬃcient structure to the internet in the future. Verizon, AT&T, Qual-
comm, Comcast, Cisco, according to Ingram[37], stand against the purpose
of regulating the internet to achieve network neutrality.
The players and the importance of the sector witness how hot the debate is
at the current moment. Ingram[37] points out, nevertheless, the distinguish-
ing traits of the American and European telecom/information technology
business environments. Overall the broadband sector appears more healthily
competitive in Europe and, at the current moment, there seems to be no real
worry justifying the need of anti-discriminatory or net neutrality policies to
guarantee the rights of content providers and final web users. This feature
can explain the diﬀerent impact the policy debate is having in these two
major economic areas.
Addressing the debate from an economic theory perspective seems crucial in
order to assess the relative merits and shortcomings of each position. Ac-
cording to Reynolds[64], the conclusions on the need of a network neutrality
regulation crucially depend on whether the markets are eﬃcient enough. The
focus should be on checking that the conditions for an eﬃcient market alloc-
ation are respected by the network structure of the internet. If this is not
the case, there maybe scope for regulation or ex-post competition authorities’
intervention.
A closer look to the wide array of economics issues arising in the broad-
band internet debate is in order at this stage. A variety of those topics are
discussed in greater detail in papers by Wu[80], Yoo[82] and more recently
Sidak[71], but a non-exhaustive list is as follows:
• Eﬀects of scale economies on networks’ size and concentration of the
industry. According to Baumol-Swanson[7] in this kind of industry ban-
ning diﬀerential pricing maybe socially detrimental not only because it
may determine some customers not participating in the market but also
because forces firms out of the market as they may not be able to cover
their own fixed costs without price discriminating;
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• Demand size economies/externalities and the size of the networks: the
claim from network neutrality proposers is that having diﬀerent net-
works from diﬀerent services may reduce the positive externalities linked
to joining the network;
• Congestion and social cost of network usage: ‘deregulationists’ claim
that price freedom can help firms in dealing with diﬀerent levels of
bandwidth usage and possible congestion. The existence of diﬀerent
networks for services diﬀering in bandwidth usage can determine a more
rational allocation of capacity;
• Vertical integration at the diﬀerent level of supply of broadband inter-
net services: competitive concern arise in case of integration between
network owners and content or service providers;
• End to end principles: engineering principles should shed light on costs
and benefits of rendering the network more sophisticated at interme-
diate levels. On the one hand, regulation would secure more freedom
in network development; on the other hand few players on the market
could ensure more coordination in the choice of the networks’ structure;
• Product diﬀerentiation, the variety of supplied services and the problem
of connectivity between networks;
• Competition and innovation in the industry. The basic questions here
seem to be: which regime would foster more competition in the internet
sector? and which one, on the other end, would guarantee the highest
rate of innovation? These seems crucial questions to look at the fu-
ture as innovation is recognized to be one of the main ingredients in
determining the rapid expansion of the industry as a whole.
The debate looks extremely complex. The scope of this chapter, neverthe-
less, it is not to outline a model that can address all those issues. A stylized
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Figure 4.1: The two-sided structure of the internet.
two-sided market model of the internet is purposed to focus on one specific
aspect of the network neutrality debate: the eﬀects of the pricing strategy
by network owners/telecom companies to internet content providers appear
to be one of the key ingredients of all the discussion. This is the reason why
it is worth to analyze the topic more in depth.
4.3 The Model
The framework used to analyze the pricing issues related to network neut-
rality explicitly recognizes the two-sided market structure of the broadband
internet industry. As Economides-Tag[25] and Katz-Hermalin[44], it is as-
sumed network owners act as intermediaries between heterogeneous content
providers and final users.
The model adopted is related to the work of Mussa-Rosen[56] who were
the first to address the issue of quality supply under incomplete information
on consumers’ tastes in one-sided markets. Maskin-Riley[51] formalization of
non-linear pricing closely parallel the one selected here despite assuming that
a continuous of price-quantity combinations can be supplied. Both of those
models assume the goods are supplied by a monopolist who can provide
diﬀerent level of qualities of the product. Monopolistic is also the market
studied by Deneckere-McAfee[20] in their analysis of ‘damaged goods’, i.e.
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goods for which the supply of the lower quality is more expensive then the
high quality one. The theoretical structure builds upon the oligopoly model
introduced by Ireland[38] and used in Chapter 3, extended to allow for two
sided markets and network externalities. The latter papers focus on the ef-
fects of non-linear pricing as compared to linear pricing when firms supply
packets of diﬀerent size; this chapter explicitly addresses the issue of quality
supply.
4.3.1 Network Owners
Access to the network is supplied by n telecommunications companies. These
companies are intermediaries between final internet users who demand ac-
cess to several services and contents on the web and companies supplying
these contents and services. The quality of the access that internet content
providers receive is a variable qL, which for convenience it is normalized to
1. The chapter will focus on two polar cases.
First, the case in which companies are allowed to supply access to only one
quality at an identical price for all providers. The contract in this case takes
the form (q, p(q)). Broadly speaking, this case can be considered as the
benchmark/current situation or the result of enforcing a network neutrality
regulation.
Second, the case in which companies are allowed to introduce a new superior
quality of service in order to screen diﬀerent content providers. The con-
tracts oﬀered in this case will be: {(qL, pL(qL)), (qH , pH(qH))} For analytical
convenience it is assumed that qH is exactly t times better than qL and this
proportion is fixed. This implies: qH = tqL with t > 1.
The technology used by firms displays constant returns to scale with respect
to quantity but not necessarily with respect to quality. The technology avail-
able to firms in fact can be described by the following cost function:
Ci(qi, xi, Qi) =
(
qLcDL(xL, xH , n) per unit of qL supplied
θqHcDH(xL, xH , n) per unit of qH if supplied
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where Di represents the demand function as defined in the next subsection.
These cost functions imply that the marginal cost of supplying quality qi is
constant. However this cost depends on the quality herself and on the para-
meters θ. This parameter captures the relative cost savings/dissavings in
supply of high quality. The feature allows to deal with a wide range of pos-
sible technologies, ranging from cost savings on quality, diminishing returns in
supply of quality and also the extreme but possible case in technological mar-
kets of damaged goods. Despite Giovannetti-D’Ignazio[34] highlight the role
of asymmetry as a key relevant determinant for the scope of network neutral-
ity regulation3, the assumption that firms are symmetric is used throughout
the chapter and it can be justified by the fact that big players in the telecom
sector, owning the internet network, can be considered of comparably big di-
mension. The focus here is, in fact, on pricing and not on inter-connectivity
issues.
4.3.2 Content Providers
Internet content providers have heterogeneous preferences for the quality of
access provided by telecom companies to their site. This heterogeneity is
captured by the type parameter x that expresses their willingness to pay for
quality of access whose distribution function is f(x) with x ∈ [0, 1]. Des-
pite not being necessary in order to find an equilibrium of the model, it will
be assumed that the providers’ types are distributed according to a uniform
distribution. This can be interpreted as companies facing a linear demand
function for a given level of quality and considerably simplifies the rest of the
analysis.
Each provider demands one quality of access for its web-site: either low or
3Giovanetti-D’Ignazio[34] use ISP level data in order to assess the importance of dif-
ferent incentives (business stealing eﬀects as opposed to the network externality eﬀect)
in determining the decision of interconnection between networks. Heterogeneity between
ISPs seems the key determinant of weather one or the other can prevail.
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high.
Marginal utility is decreasing so that the higher quality access gives a pro-
portionally lower utility to the provider. A key assumption is that the di-
minishing marginal returns to quality is the same across all providers.
A positive network externality exists so that the utility of content providers
will depend on the total proportion of final users who access the web. This
can be interpreted as follows: more internet users implies more probability
of your content being used, your service being demanded or your site being
visited; this probability increases the income the content providers can get
from advertisers or other sponsors.
Consistently with the described features of providers’ tastes, the utility func-
tion can be described as:
U(qi, x) =
(
x+ γ(1−G(yˆ))− pL(qL) for qL
bx+ γ(1−G(yˆ))− pH(qH) for qH
in which x ∈ [0, 1] describes the type of provider, p(q) is the price of the
contract signed with the telecom company for the quality demanded and the
parameter b captures the marginal returns to quality perceived by content
suppliers.
In case network owners supply both qualities, the utilities of content providers
should respect the following constraints:
U(qL, x) = x+ γ(1−G(yˆ))− pL(qL) ≥ 0
U(qH , x) = bx+ γ(1−G(yˆ))− pH(qH) ≥ U(qL, x)
4.3.3 Final Users
Final users are heterogeneous in their evaluation of the access to the web y,
a continuous variable distributed according to g(y), y ∈ [0, 1]. Users’ utility
however depends also on the quality of the service they receive. As users surf
on a number of web-sites, it can be assumed that the quality they receive is
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proportional to the number of providers who demand a high quality access
to the network and providers who opt for the lower quality option. The
following quality index is then employed:
Q(xˆL, xˆH) = [1− F (xˆH)]h+ [F (xˆH)− F (xˆL)]
where h is the perceived quality increase if accessing a high quality web
content. Moreover, final users face a double network externality. Their utility
depends on the number of users on the web and increases as the content
provided on the web increases. Under this assumptions the utility of web
surfers can be described by the following function:
Uy = y + αQ(xˆL, xˆH) + µ1(1−G(yˆ)) + µ2(1− F (xˆL))− a
Clearly, for final users to participate in the market Uy ≥ 0 must hold.
4.4 Solution of the Model
This section characterizes the solution of the model under two possible situ-
ations of interest: the neutral network regulated equilibrium and the case
in which the network owners supply more than one quality of access to the
network both to final users and content providers. The equilibria are charac-
terized in terms of market shares served and equilibrium prices. Numerical
examples illustrate the profits of the network owners and the surplus of both
the final users and the content providers.
4.4.1 The Neutral Network Equilibrium: One Quality-
One Price of Access
This section analyzes the case of network neutrality: all network owning
companies oﬀer access to both providers and final users at a uniform price
and quality.
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The first step is to derive the demand functions faced by firms on both sides.
Assuming that firms only oﬀer one level of quality qL and the distribution
of both content providers and final users is uniform, content providers will
choose to buy or not access to the network depending on:
max{0, x+ γ(1− yˆ)− p(qL)}
The previous expression implies that a content provider is indiﬀerent between
buying access or staying out of the web if:
xˆ = p(qL)− γ(1− yˆ)
An analogous way of reasoning allow to identify the final users who are
indiﬀerent between accessing the internet or not. These are defined by:
yˆ =
an− µ1
n− µ1
− (α+ µ2)n(1− xˆ)
n− µ1
All providers with an evaluation of access superior to xˆ and all final users
characterized by a type y will subscribe to one of the telecom’s network. The
profit function faced by each network is then:
πj = [pL(qL)− c]Dx(xˆ) + (a− k)Dy(yˆ) = [xˆ+ γ(1− y)− c]
∙
1− xˆ
n
¸
+
+
∙
yˆ + α(1− xˆ) + µ1(1− yˆ)
n
+ µ2(1− xˆ)− k
¸ ∙
1− yˆ
n
¸
∀j = 1..n
The first order conditions are, respectively:
∂πj
∂xˆ
=
1− xˆ
n
− [xˆ+ γ(1− yˆ)− c] = 0
∂πj
∂yˆ
=
1− yˆ
n
−
∙
yˆ + α(1− xˆ) + µ1
(1− yˆ)
n
+ µ2(1− xˆ)− k
¸
= 0
The indiﬀerent final users and content providers can then be characterized
as a function of the models parameters:
xˆ = xˆ(c, k, α, µ1, µ2, γ, n)
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yˆ = yˆ(c, k, α, µ1, µ2, γ, n)
The equilibrium expressions of the benchmark case can then be characterized
in terms of the indiﬀerent consumers as:
Table 4.1 The Network Neutrality Equilibrium
MSx 1−xˆn
MSy
1−yˆ
n
p(qL) xˆ+ γ(1− yˆ)
a yˆ + α(1− xˆ) + µ1 (1−yˆ)n + µ2(1− xˆ)
A numerical example, useful to illustrate the network neutrality equilib-
rium, is proposed in section 4.4.3.
4.4.2 Quality Discrimination and Network Access
If companies supply two types of access contracts, then content providers
decide whether to access the internet and select the contract (qi, pi(qi)) ac-
cording to the following criterium:
max{0, x+ γ(1− y∗)− pL(qL), bx+ γ(1− y∗)− pH(qH)}
To define the demand functions it is crucial to characterize the marginal
providers, given the set of prices (pL(qL), pH(qH)). Content provider x∗L is
indiﬀerent between buying nothing or one unit if:
x∗L + γ(1− y∗)− pL(qL) = 0⇔ x∗L = pL(qL)− γ(1− y∗)
The provider x∗H is indiﬀerent between the low or the high quality if:
(b− 1)x∗H = pH(qL)− pL(qL)
The preceding equation implies:
x∗H =
pH(qH)− pL(qL)
b− 1
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The demand for each quality, faced by a generic network owner, is:
Dj(x∗L, x
∗
H , n) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0 if 0 < x < x∗L
x∗H−x∗L
n if x
∗
L < x < x
∗
H
1−x∗H
n if x
∗
H < x < 1
Analogous reasoning allows to define the demand faced on the other side of
the market from final users. These are willing to access the web if and only
if:
Uy = y + αQ(x∗L, x
∗
H) + µ1(1− y∗) + µ2(1− x∗L)− a ≥ 0
implying that the indiﬀerent consumer is defined by:
y∗ =
αQ(x∗L, x
∗
H) + µ1 + µ2(1− x∗L)
1− µ1
− a
1− µ1
The profit function of each firm is:
πj =
∙
x∗H − x∗L
n
¸
[x∗L + γ(1− y∗)− c] +
∙
1− x∗H
n
¸
[(b− 1)x∗H + x∗L + γ(1− y∗)− tθc] +
+ {y∗ + αQ(x∗L, x∗H) + µ1(1− y∗) + µ2(1− x∗L)− k}
∙
1− y∗
n
¸
after having substituted for pH(qH), pL(qL) and a the relative expressions in
terms of the indiﬀerent web users and providers.
The first order conditions with respect to x∗L , x
∗
H and y
∗are then given by:
∂πj
∂x∗L
=
1− x∗L
n
− [x∗L + γ(1− y∗)− c]− [α+ µ2]
∙
1− y∗
n
¸
= 0
∂πj
∂x∗H
= (b− 1)1− x
∗
H
n
− [(b− 1)x∗H − (tθ − 1)c]− αt = 0
∂πj
∂y∗
= (1− µ1)
∙
1− y∗
n
¸
− {y∗ + αQ(x∗L, x∗H) + µ1(1− y∗) + µ2(1− x∗L)− k}+
−γ
∙
1− x∗L
n
¸
= 0
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Under the assumptions made, it is possible to solve the system of equations
to find the equilibrium indiﬀerent consumers as a function of the parameters
of the models:
x∗L = x
∗
L(b, c, k, h, θ, t, α, γ, µ1, µ2, n)
x∗H = x
∗
H(b, c, k, h, θ, t, α, γ, µ1, µ2, n)
y∗ = y∗(b, c, k, h, θ, t, α, γ, µ1, µ2, n)
This equilibrium can be characterized in term of market served and prices
on the two sides of the market as follows:
Table 4.2 Non-Regulated Quality Competition Equilibrium
MSx1 1− x∗1
MSx2 x∗2 − x∗1
MSy 1− y∗
pL x∗L + γ(1− y∗)
pH (b− 1)x∗H + x∗L + γ(1− y∗)
a y∗ + αQ(x∗1, x
∗
2) + µ1(1− y∗) + µ2(1− x∗1)
The following numerical example is useful to illustrate the unregulated
equilibrium and the features of the model presented.
4.4.3 A Numerical Illustration
Suppose the following values are set for the relevant parameters of the model:
Parameter c k α γ µ1 µ2 n h θ t b
Value 0.25 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 3 2 1 2 1.8
In the network neutrality benchmark, the model has a "well behaved"
solution characterized by the following values of the relevant variables:
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xˆ 0.553
yˆ 0.517
MSx 0.447
MSy 0.483
p(qL) 0.601
a 0.622
πj 0.120
SCP 0.100
SFU 0.113
SW 0.574
where SCP and SFU stand for content providers and final users surpluses
respectively and SW represents aggregate social welfare.
The model can be solved under quality discrimination. A "well behaved"
solution is then characterized by the following values of the relevant econom-
ics variables:
x∗L 0.389
x∗H 0.689
y∗ 0.498
MSx 0.611
MSy 0.502
p(qL) 0.439
p(qH) 0.750
a 0.606
πj 0.113
SCP 0.300
SFU 0.122
SW 0.761
The example provided is useful to illustrate the properties of the model
adopted. The eﬀect of quality discrimination as compared to a network neut-
rality benchmark can be summarized in three main eﬀects: first, the share
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of both final users and content providers participating in the market largely
increases when discrimination is allowed; second, both the price charged to
final users and of the access to low quality decrease as compared with the
benchmark while the price of high quality is expectedly higher; third, given
the first two eﬀects, the eﬀect on surplus of final users and content providers is
positive. This implies an overall positive eﬀect on social welfare, as measured
by the sum of welfare of all agents involved.
It should be clear, as already pointed out by Hermalin-Katz[44], that in
the context of this model there seems to be little point to push for network
neutrality regulation on the basis of non-discrimination concerns. However,
the type of modelling approach adopted here and in Hermalin-Katz[44] gives
clearly the best chances to non-linear pricing to have positive welfare eﬀects.
The point this chapter would like to stress, instead, is what elements of the
internet industry structure seem to make network neutrality more or less
socially desirable. That type of analysis is provided in the following section.
4.5 Analysis of the Results and Implications
This section focuses on the eﬀect of the relevant features of the network
owners’ supply and of the users’ and providers’ demand for internet access
in determining the eﬀects of an eventual network neutrality regulation.
The approach of analysis adopted is to focus on the eﬀects of the para-
meters which characterize the relevant features of the preferences and of the
technology on all sides of the market. This is done by considering the net-
work neutral equilibrium as compared with the non-regulated equilibrium.
In this section, basically, it will be presented the eﬀect of the parameters in
determining the eﬀect of network neutrality regulation with respect to the
relevant variables. The pictures that will be presented in what follows repres-
ent the diﬀerence in the levels of a variable when passing from a situation of
quality supply freedom and discrimination to a regulated one with network
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neutrality. So, for the variable X, a graph would represent the function:
∆X = Xˆ −X∗
in which a positive value implies network neutrality is increasing the amount
of the variable with respect to quality discrimination, while the opposite is
true if the value is negative. A similar strategy of analysis is adopted by
Armstrong-Vickers[6] in their study of the relevant features influencing the
eﬀects of non-linear pricing and bundling as compared with linear pricing.
4.5.1 The Eﬀect of Quality
The first and most important question posed by the network neutrality de-
bate is what happens if network owners are allowed to discriminate between
diﬀerent content providers. In other words, if some of the providers can be-
nefit of the so called internet highways, how will this impact low end content
providers, demanding standard quality, and final users?
The approach taken is that the eﬀect of a quality discrimination will de-
pend both on the eﬀective quality increase, as captured by t, and by the
perceived quality increase by both final users and content providers, as cap-
tured respectively by h and b.
Figure 4.2 represent the diﬀerential between the variables in the two situ-
ations considered as a function of the actual increase in quality t, assuming
that θ = 1 and h = 2, i.e. that there are constant returns to supplying quality
and the final users perceive that high quality is twice as good as the low. The
yellow line represents the profits diﬀerential. As it can be seen, if the actual
quality is not very diﬀerent with respect to the low quality, then network
neutrality reduces owner’s profits. However, as soon as the actual quality
increases, approaching and exceeding t = h = 2 profits of the firms are en-
hanced by network neutrality. This can be interpreted as follows: supposing
that actual quality is higher than the quality perceived by content providers,
then it is better for owners to commit not to supply the high quality, as it is
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Figure 4.2: Diﬀerential of Profits (Yellow), Final Users’ Surplus (Blue), Con-
tent Providers’Surplus (Purple) and Social Welfare (Green) plotted against
actual quality t.
the case in presence of network neutrality regulation. Values of parameters
larger than t = 5 or t = 6 do not look very realistic, as it is very unlikely
that providers do not feel such a major increase in quality. In technological
markets, however, it is not rare the case in which further sensible advance-
ments in technology are not perceived as important by the beneficiaries of it:
this is the case, for example, of high speed internet connections. It is really
diﬃcult for users to discern in many situations the speed of a connection. In
such a case it is the right part of the graph to become relevant and, regard-
ing profits, it is clear that quality discrimination is a much better deal for
network companies. The purple line describes the content providers’ surplus
diﬀerential. Net neutrality seems to harm them by preventing them to access
the high quality of the version. However, when the actual quality becomes
too large without them realizing it, they are damaged by the increase in prices
for the two qualities and the corresponding restriction of the market served4.
4The evidence regarding the diﬀerential in prices and shares of market served is not
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The blue line represents the diﬀerential in the surplus of final users: these
are clearly damaged by network neutrality regulation for most of the likely
values of actual quality. The green line, finally, presents the total surplus
diﬀerential. In this case too, for the most likely values of the actual quality
network neutrality seems have a strongly negative eﬀect on the economy: this
eﬀect is explained by net neutrality implying on average larger prices and a
lower share of the market served. Only for intermediate values of quality,
when profits are not too damaged by regulation and a slight positive eﬀect
is registered for users and providers, the net eﬀect on surplus is positive.
A dynamic interpretation of the interaction between actual and perceived
quality can be put forward. Suppose, in fact, as suggested by Economides-
Tag[25], that in the beginning the supply of a high quality version of internet
access to content providers is not implying an actual increase in quality. This
would imply that t = 1 while providers and final users may think to receive
higher quality than they actually do. Mutatis mutandis, the result obtained
is the opposite of Economides-Tag[25]: network neutrality has an absolutely
negative impact on welfare. It can be supposed that quality increases in the
long run and becomes equal to the perceived one: the strong negative welfare
eﬀect of regulation is consistent with the findings of Hermalin-Katz5. In the
long run technology can overshoot perception, with the consequences that
were analyzed above.
Figure 4.3 is analogous to Figure 4.2 but the variables are plotted against
the perceived increase in quality h, given that actual quality is t = 2 and final
users evaluation is b = 1.8. The eﬀect of perceived quality is monotone on the
variables analyzed. As the blue function highlights, network owners’ profits
increase under network neutrality as perceived quality increases. Network
neutrality, instead, damages final users (purple function) and to a larger
extent content providers (yellow function). This is quite reasonable: as the
presented in the paper but it is available upon request from the author.
5Hermalin-Katz[44], Proposition 6.
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Figure 4.3: Diﬀerential of Profits (Blue), Final Users’ Surplus (Purple), Con-
tent Providers’Surplus (Yellow) and Social Welfare (Green) plotted against
quality perceived by final users h.
perceived quality increases, network neutrality denying companies to supply
the higher quality hurts more and more final users, who can not transform
their preferences in higher utility. As for content providers, the restriction to
supply only the low quality implies a lower ability to satisfy users’ demand
and so to self-select them; this translates in a higher average price faced and
lower share of them taking part into the market. The overall welfare eﬀect
(green function) is then clearly negative.
Figure 4.4 deals instead with the diﬀerential in the four variables con-
sidered plotted against the evaluation of high quality of content providers.
It is supposed that the actual quality is t = 2, there are constant returns
to quality θ = 1 and perceived quality is h = 2. Network neutrality, as
witnessed by the purple function, has a positive eﬀect on network owners’
profits. However, as decreasing marginal returns in the demand of quality
are less intense, the profit diﬀerential after joining its maximum tends to
become thinner until it vanishes. Final users surplus (blue line) and content
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Figure 4.4: Diﬀerential of Profits (Purple), Final Users’ Surplus (Blue), Con-
tent Providers’Surplus (Yellow) and Social Welfare (Green) plotted against
content providers’ returns to quality b.
providers’ surplus (yellow line) suﬀer even sharper losses from the adoption
of regulation. These losses become larger as the marginal evaluation of high
quality increases. Intuitively, the eﬀect is similar to what was found regarding
the quality perceived by final users: as network neutrality impedes the sup-
ply of high quality, content providers suﬀer out of it more and more as their
evaluation of the product increases. This is reflected also on final users who
face higher prices and a lower share of them is served under net neutrality.
The overall welfare eﬀect (green curve) is also negative.
4.5.2 The Eﬀect of Technology
The cost of providing access to users and content providers aﬀorded by the
network owners may play an important role in determining the eﬀect of
network neutrality regulation. As underlined by Cheung-Wang[14], in a one-
sided market bundling model, a relatively high unit cost of production may
suggest a detrimental eﬀect of a regulation impeding discrimination.
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Figure 4.5: Diﬀerential of Profits (Yellow), Final Users’ Surplus (Purple),
Content Providers’Surplus (Green) and Social Welfare (Blue) plotted against
the marginal cost of serving content providers c.
Figure 4.5 displays the diﬀerentials between network neutrality and qual-
ity discrimination plotted against the marginal cost of serving content pro-
viders c. Network neutrality tends to have a weak positive eﬀect on profits
for intermediate values of the marginal cost. The diﬀerence tends to be neg-
ligible for more extreme values, both on the lower and higher end of marginal
costs. Negative, instead, is the eﬀect of regulation on both final users and
content providers. The more eﬃcient network owners in supplying the con-
tent providers, the more damaging regulation would be for content providers
themselves and social welfare as a whole. There are, however, extremely high
values of the marginal cost for which regulation is increasing the welfare of all
agents involved. The final interpretation is then the following: net neutrality
regulation can have a positive eﬀect and should be considered if the sector
displays extremely high costs of providing access to content providers.
Figure 4.6 displays the eﬀects of regulation as compared to quality dif-
ferentiation as a function of the marginal cost of serving final users. As the
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Figure 4.6: Diﬀerential of Profits (Green), Final Users’ Surplus (Purple),
Content Providers’Surplus (Yellow) and Social Welfare (Blue) plotted against
the marginal cost of serving final users k.
cost is low, network owners, whose profits diﬀerential is in green, have an
advantage from the network neutrality regulation as opposed to final users
who are actually damaged and would prefer quality discrimination. As the
cost of serving them increases, however, the two regimes do not diﬀer sub-
stantially, as the purple function shows. Strongly negative, instead, is the
eﬀect of regulation for content providers: as witnessed by the blue func-
tion, as the marginal cost of serving the other side increases there is only a
non-substantial improvement for their welfare.
Figures 4.7 displays the diﬀerential between the network neutral and the
quality discrimination equilibria as a function of the parameter θ which is
capturing the returns to quality in supply. The yellow function highlights
that profits are always reduced by network neutrality when supplying the
high quality implies non-negligible positive cost savings. In presence of non-
negligible cost savings, network neutrality becomes less and less desirable also
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Figure 4.7: Diﬀerential of Profits (Purple), Final Users’ Surplus (Yellow),
Content Providers’Surplus (Blue) and Social Welfare (Green) plotted against
the marginal returns in supplying quality θ.
for final users, content providers’ and, obviously, the aggregate social welfare.
The diﬀerential for these variables are depicted in the figure in purple, blue
and green respectively.
The surplus of final users, however, is not decreasing monotonically with
θ: for rather extremely high returns to quality, comprehending also the case of
damaged goods (θ < 0), the eﬀect of network neutrality keeps being negative,
but progressively less so. The cause of this eﬀect is probably to be traced
back to prices of access: as θ decreases, the access fee paid by final users
becomes relatively lower under network neutrality and this is compensating
the relative decrease in consumers served.
4.5.3 The Eﬀects of Network Externalities
Network externalities play a very important role when dealing with two-sided
networks: the utility of an agent depends on how many agents participate in
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Figure 4.8: Diﬀerential of Profits (Green), Final Users’ Surplus (Yellow),
Content Providers’Surplus (Blue) and Social Welfare (Purple) plotted against
the eﬀect of network externalities of final users on content providers γ.
the market both on his side and on the other side. The model set up allows
to evaluate both the eﬀect of such externalities on final users and on content
providers, both in case there is a positive participation externality and in
case more participation may imply congestion.
Figure 4.8 displays the eﬀects of network neutrality regulation on the vari-
ables of interest for a wide range of combinations of γ, the externality by final
users on content providers. Results diﬀer in case final users’ participation im-
plies a positive eﬀect for content providers, as opposed to the case they imply,
instead, a negative congestion eﬀect. As expected, when more users imply
congestion, network neutrality may have positive eﬀects. The orthants on
the left in the figure display that network neutrality has a positive eﬀect for
final users: when the content provided is of a uniform quality, then the share
of consumers served is reduced, implying reduced congestion. As illustrated
by the blue curve, also the negative eﬀect of regulation on content providers
is milder in presence of congestion. A weak but negative eﬀect related to
regulation is registered also with respect to profits (green curve). This is
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overturned and definitely more intense when the externality of final users
on content providers is positive. In that case, however, network neutrality
displays a strong negative eﬀect on final users, content providers and social
welfare (purple curve): the reason is once more to be traced to the share
of market served, which increases on both sides as quality discrimination is
allowed.
Figure 4.9 focuses on the eﬀect of externalities of final users on themselves:
more users accessing the web may have a positive eﬀect for everyone or be
a source of congestion. However, no matter the sign of the externality, the
eﬀect of regulation is positive for profits, as the green function witnesses.
The amount of the advantages of net neutrality for owners is increasing in
µ1. A negative eﬀect is registered for final users’ surplus (yellow curve): as
intuitively expected, the magnitude of the eﬀect increases with µ1, i.e. with
the impact that final users who access the web have on themselves. This
result is to be coupled with the negative impact of net neutrality on the
share of users served. Participation decreases under net neutrality, and more
severely, for content providers: this explains the strong negative eﬀect on
their surplus, as in the purple curve. This is only partially oﬀset when there
is congestion. The yellow line displays how net neutrality negatively impacts
social welfare, no matter the sign of externality.
Finally, Figure 4.10 shows the eﬀect of the externality exerted by content
providers on final users. This is positive when users display preference for
variety of the content when navigating. However, it may be negative when
the amount of information provided is too large so that the users find diﬃcult
to surf the web eﬃciently for their needs. Once more, preference for variety
determines a positive eﬀect of net neutrality for profits, as witnessed by the
yellow function in the positive orthant.
Network owners, however, would be better oﬀ to quality diﬀerentiate
when final users are negative aﬀected by the plethora of contents available
online. These results are exactly reversed when dealing with final users:
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Figure 4.9: Diﬀerential of Profits (Green), Final Users’ Surplus (Blue), Con-
tent Providers’Surplus (Purple) and Social Welfare (Yellow) plotted against
the eﬀect of externalities of final users on themselves µ1.
Figure 4.10: Diﬀerential of Profits (Yellow), Final Users’ Surplus (Blue),
Content Providers’Surplus (Green) and Social Welfare (Red) plotted against
the eﬀect of the externality of content providers on final users µ2.
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the blue line shows as they are better oﬀ under net neutrality only when
they are negatively aﬀected by the amount of information supplied. This
eﬀect is absolutely analogous to the one described when dealing with the
externality of final users on content providers: as net neutrality implies a
decrease in participation by content providers, then final users are better oﬀ.
These negative eﬀect on participation of content providers, however, harms
the welfare of this last category of agents: as the green line displays, network
neutrality damages them, the eﬀect is only mitigated in presence of a negative
externality while is magnified when it is positive. Network neutrality has an
overall negative eﬀect, more intense when the externality is positive.
4.6 Concluding Remarks
This chapter aimed to analyze the eﬀects of a non-discrimination requirement
on network owners, in case network neutrality regulation is adopted. This
has been achieved by introducing a model of the broadband internet which
recognizes explicitly its two-sided market structure. Network owners are
intermediaries between final users of the web and content providers. This
tentative analysis is based on a number of simplifying assumptions and on an
overly stylized representation of reality: for this reason, its policy implications
should not be overemphasized. It is however important to underline that this
research allows to draw the attention on a few interesting aspects related to
the impact of an eventual adoption of network neutrality regulation. In
particular, the role of demand and supply side characteristics on all sides of
the market is taken into account in determining the eﬀects of regulation on
all the involved agents.The results seem to suggest that regulation is likely to
restrict the options available to content providers and as such reduce theirs
and final users’ welfare. Factors which mitigate this eﬀect are high costs of
supply of the two sides of the market, high actual quality with respect to the
perception of users, relatively low evaluation of quality of content providers,
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the presence of congestion on content providers’ side and excess information,
implying for example higher searching costs, on the final users’ side.
The analysis provided has been confronted with the results in the most
closely related literature. There are, however, two further issues which should
be addressed in the developments of this research to exhaust the analysis of
net neutrality within the model adopted. First, nothing has been said about
how network neutrality and quality discriminating outcomes compare with
the social welfare maximizing outcome. Secondly a few authors, including
Economides-Tag[25], adopt a rather extreme view regarding network neutral-
ity and non-discrimination. According to them, in fact, the network is really
neutral if and only if access is provided for free. Within our framework this
would imply full coverage on the content providers side. The eﬀect would
be to neutralize all the gains related to a larger share of the market under
quality discrimination. A comparison of our results with this more extreme
regulatory regime maybe of some interest. Finally, despite the wealth of
simplifying assumptions, the model is extremely rich and it is this wealth of
details which allows to capture many eﬀects not completely highlighted by
the previous literature. Future developments, however may try to simplify
further the setting in order to focus on the eﬀects of quality supply in two
sided markets. This topic seems quite interesting and rather unexplored in
the theoretical literature.
There is a wealth of issues of the net neutrality debate which may be
worth to address in a two-sided market perspective. Important dynamic
aspects relate to a non-discrimination regulation: competition, the possibility
of entry and the incentives to innovate are crucial for the destiny of the
internet industry in the long run. The oligopolistic structure of a market
characterized by large telecom companies owning the network seems to fit
the presented model in which they compete for the market share à la Cournot.
This, however, may suggest the possibility of tacit collusion between network
owners. A repeated interaction structure of the model can help shed light on
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how diﬀerent patterns of regulation impact on likelihood of collusion. The
vertical structure of the internet can also be considered: the possibility of
vertical mergers and the formations of coalitions between network owners
and content providers may have an important eﬀect on welfare.
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Part III
Conclusions
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Chapter 5
Final Considerations
Non-linear pricing is a widespread practice in most real world markets. These
markets are characterized, although to diﬀerent extents, by competition: the
extremes cases of monopoly and perfect competition are in most cases just
interesting textbook caricatures not very suitable for the interpretation of
reality. The sophistication of pricing practices has increased in the latest
decades due to the technological advances in information technology. Com-
panies try to gather more and more data on consumers to reconstruct their
preferences and demographic data. This information is precious and can be
productively used to personalize oﬀers and pricing. The thesis is focused
on the eﬀect of both increased information and competition on the eﬀects
of non-linear pricing on agents and their welfare. The analysis is conduc-
ted adopting the perspective of the new theory of industrial organization,
mainly developed in the last three decades, that captures strategic interac-
tion between firms as a non-cooperative game. This approach allows to model
eﬀectively the strategic issues involved in non-linear pricing under compet-
ition. Along these lines, Chapter 1 provides the motivation for writing a
thesis on non-linear pricing and some of its applications.
Chapter 2 reviews the theory of oligopolistic non-linear pricing. Non-
linear pricing is a special case of price discrimination taking place in pres-
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ence of asymmetric information. The theory of price discrimination has to
be modified in presence of oligopolistic competition. A crucial role is played
by the competitive externality imposed by rival firms. This eﬀect tends to
erode firms profits. In order to avoid an outcome similar to the "Bertrand
paradox" and explain the prevalence of non-linear pricing in real world mar-
kets, two approaches have been taken in the literature. The first assumes
that firms compete in pricing schedules but their products are diﬀerentiated.
Product diﬀerentiation is then closely related to the possibility of discrimin-
ating and plays a crucial role within this approach. The foundations of the
approach rely on mechanism design under common agency: firms compete
for a common mass of consumers. Exploiting this parallel it is shown that
firms face a type dependent participation constraint. The other modelling
option is quantity competition. In this case horizontal product diﬀerentiation
is not crucial as firms behave as monopolists facing a residual demand for
each type of agents. The usual Cournot intuition that the mark up is related
to the demand elasticity and the number of firms carries on in this case,
when considering the diﬀerent types independently. It turns out that there
is a close link between non-linear pricing and the recent developments in the
theory of vertical diﬀerentiation. Suppose firms are selecting a product line
characterized by diﬀerent qualities of a good, then most economic principles
used to find the optimal non-linear price schedule apply also in this case.
This parallel has been exploited in the literature to study the strategies of
firms when deciding whether to introduce products of higher or lower quality
to the range they already oﬀer. The model can be extened to show how the
same economic intuition on quality supply applies to the case of two-sided
markets.
One remarkable result, no matter the approach adopted, is that in a
competitive setting not necessarily the possibility of discriminating favours
firms. In fact, in presence of "best response asymmetry", firms face a prison-
ers’ dilemma strategic situation: the private gain from non-linear pricing is
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transormed in a public loss when all firms adopt the same strategy with the
results that firms would be better oﬀ if they could commit to price uniformly.
Chapter 3 focuses on technology and its relation with non-linear pricing.
The motivating question is linked to everyday’s shopping experience sug-
gesting that many products can be purchased in several diﬀerent sizes, while
others are supplied in one size only. The explanation provided suggests a re-
lationship between the demand and the technological structure of the market
that determines the size of the products supplied by firms in equilibrium. The
chapter focuses on a model in which firms supply a homogeneous product in
packets of diﬀerent sizes. Information about consumers’ reservation prices is
incomplete and the production technology is characterized by size economies.
Four equilibrium regions are identified depending on the relative intensity of
size economies with respect to consumers’ evaluation of the good. Regions
are characterized by the product being supplied either in a single unit or
in several sizes or in only a large size, including diﬀerent units bundled to-
gether. Both the private and social desirability of non-linear pricing varies
across diﬀerent equilibrium regions; the general conclusion, however, is that
in presence of size economies the overall welfare eﬀect is likely to be positive,
although profits might decrease as compared with the linear pricing case.
Chapter 4 considers the broadband internet market, an extremely dy-
namic sector, which is attracting the attention of politicians and other act-
ors, besides the companies operating in the sector. Broadly speaking, the
market is characterized by oligopolistic telecom companies owning the net-
works. They provide modern fast-speed internet services being intermediaries
between content providers and final users. Content providers are users who
own a web site and provide contents or services over the net to final users
that benefit of the contents and services available. The framework is then
carachterized by huge cross platform externalities. In such a situation, non-
discriminatory issues stand the core of the recent debate on the opportunity
or not of regulating the internet. According to some, the success of the in-
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ternet is due to its accessibility. In the past this was always guaranteed for
free to whoever desired to contribute to its development. This accessibility
could be jeopardized in the context of the new bradband internet structure.
One of the main questions posed, in fact, is whether the telecom companies
should be allowed to oﬀer quality-contingent contracts to content providers.
In other words, the problem is the eﬀect of discrimination on users who re-
quire diﬀerent type of access services for their business. The chapter provides
an analysis of the issue through a stylized two-sided market model of the web
that highlights the eﬀects of such a discrimination over quality, prices and
participation to the internet of both providers and final users. An overall
welfare comparison is proposed, concluding that the eﬀects of regulation cru-
cially depend on both the technology and preferences of agents. Although
network neutrality seems to disadvantage both content providers and final
users, there are situations in which a case for regulation can be made.
The work presented in this thesis is not immune of limitations and aspects
of not complete satisfaction. Many of the current limitations can be seen as
important triggers for further research and are discussed in what follows.
The research on size economies is a first attempt to analyze the size of
products that can be found on the market. One possible extension should
take into account the possibility that both a single size and a bundle made
of several units of the good are supplied. This is an often seen feature and
several good are sold in diﬀerent packets at the same time as, for example,
beer or crisps. Further, the analysis should be generalized in order to weaken
a few of the assumptions. First, the model can be extended to the case of
price as the choice variable of firms. This robustness check would allow to
compare the results with the alternative approach in the theory of non-linear
pricing, reviewed in Chapter 2. Second, the shape of both preferences and
of technologies considered is not general enough. The assumption that a
further unit is evaluated proportionally the same by all consumers should be
relaxed. Moreover, the technological structure allowing for negative returns
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to size or the even more extreme case of damaged goods has to be considered
to complete the analysis. Finally, the main limitation of the model is that it
does not allow to fully characterize the strategic interaction between firms. It
would be desirable, instead, to analyze the payoﬀ when one firm adopts non-
linear pricing while the other prices linearly. This would complete the matrix
of a game in which pricing strategies are the choice variables: the conjecture
is that under some conditions firms might face a prisoners’ dilemma, a new
finding in presence of quantity competition. Technical diﬃculties, however,
did not allow to prove that yet.
With reference to the research on network neutrality, as underlined in
the text, there is a wide array of economic issues to be taken into account
when considering the topic. One immediate extension of the research would
involve to "calibrate" the model in the text with estimates of the parameters
provided by the literature or by actual data regarding the extent of network
externalities, costs or congestion eﬀects. This exercise would make the ex-
ample more relevant and authoritative; the problem, however, consists in the
availability of the data needed for such a parametrization. One way to get
around these diﬃculties is to consider estimation models of the type often
applied in competition policy analysis and based on the available data on
the UK case: this option is being explored at the current moment. The ana-
lysis can also be improved by providing comparative statics on more than
one parameter at the same time: as the model is quite rich, the diﬃculty is
represented by the dimension of the equilibrium expressions obtained. In the
context of a parametrized example, however, it would be possible to show
the comparative statics with respect to a subset of the parameters at each
time. The model proposed can be simplified or enriched at need in order
to accommodate further related relevant issues like incentives to innovation,
compatibility of applications, vertical integration and the structure of the
internet from backbone to the last mile or the eﬀect of fixed costs of con-
struction and improvement of the network.
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